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ABSTRACT
The charter of a corporation is the “constitution” agreed to by all
its members. The charter, however, is not a “suicide pact,” it can be
amended according to the charter amendment rules in corporate law
when circumstances change. These charter amendment rules vary
significantly across jurisdictions. In Delaware, shareholders can
amend the charter with a simple majority vote of shares. The
amendment must be initiated by the board of directors and decisions
to amend the charter are made usually by a supermajority vote of
shares. Board approval is not necessary in the United Kingdom,
Germany, or France. Within a given jurisdiction, the rules
governing the amendment of different provisions are also very
different. This Article makes the first attempt to employ the
constitutional economic theory developed by Buchanan and Tullock
to explain different charter amendment rules. It identifies a
fundamental tradeoff between the needs of adaptation and
commitment. If charter amendment rules are too procedurally
burdensome, they may harm the adaptation of corporate charters. If
they do not impose meaningful regulation on charter amendment,
minority shareholders cannot be sure that corporate insiders or
controlling shareholders would not amend the charter in the
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midstream to harm shareholders’ interests. Different states may
choose different charter amendment rules to achieve a balance
between adaptation and commitment. The choice between different
charter amendment rules made by different states can be explained
by several factors, including institutional investors and judicial
capacity. This theory sheds new light on a series of issues in the
corporate law literature, including the explanation for mandatory
rules and appraisal rights in corporate law, the debate of increasing
shareholder power in the United States, and why law, rather than
contract, is important in corporate governance.
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INTRODUCTION
The charter of a corporation is the “constitution” of the
corporation that sets out the “rules of the game.” The charter,
however, is not a “suicide pact,” it is subject to amendment pursuant
to the charter amendment rules when circumstances change. 1 A
comparative study of the charter amendment rules in several major
jurisdictions—the state of Delaware in the United States, the United
Kingdom (U.K.), France, and Germany—shows that different
jurisdictions have adopted very different charter amendment rules.
For example, while the corporate law in Delaware mandates that
only the board has the power to initiate an amendment to the
corporate charter and a simple majority vote of shares is necessary
to pass an amendment to corporate charters, a decision to amend the
charter in the U.K. does not need board approval but must be
approved by a three-fourths majority vote of shares.2 Within a given
jurisdiction, the amendment rules for different provisions in the
corporate charter are also different—some provisions are subject to
amendment by a majority or a supermajority vote of shares while
others are mandatory rules that cannot be amended.
This Article endeavors to develop a theoretical framework to
analyze the social costs associated with different charter amendment
rules and to explain the variation of these rules both across and
within jurisdictions. It argues that two goals that are usually in
conflict need to be considered in choosing the rules that govern the
amendment of a corporate charter: adaptability and commitment.3 A
corporation may exist for a long time. When circumstances change,
the corporate charter also needs to adapt. While all shareholders
1
Different states use different terms to refer to the charters, including, for
example, “certificate of incorporation” in the state of Delaware and “articles of
associations” in the United Kingdom. See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 101(a) (2019),
[https://perma.cc/H5RH-B5JA]; Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 17 (Eng.)
[https://perma.cc/B9WD-KJ7J. See also DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 109 (2019)
[https://perma.cc/H5RH-B5JA] (describing the requirements for adopting,
amending, and appealing bylaws). The Delaware Corporate Code uses the term
“charter” in a broad sense. It includes the bylaws that contain provisions that are
relatively unimportant.
2 See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b) (2019), [https://perma.cc/H5RH-B5JA];
Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 283 (Eng.), [https://perma.cc/B9WD-KJ7J].
3
See Henry Hansmann, Corporation and Contract, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 9
(2006) (discussing the costs and benefits of a charter that is difficult to amend versus
a charter that is easy to amend).
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agree to the corporate charter when they join the corporation,
unanimous consent is usually not required when the charter is to be
amended.4 Requiring unanimous consent would negatively affect
the charter’s adaptability.5 On the other hand, if the charter can be
amended too easily, the unanimous consent given by the
shareholders at the time when the charter was enacted becomes
meaningless because a corporate insider can always change the
“rules of the game” afterwards. If the corporate charter can be
amended simply by a majority vote of shares without any further
legal constraints, including fiduciary duty or mandatory rules in
corporate law, corporate insiders or the shareholders controlling a
majority of shares may amend the charters opportunistically.
Expecting this problem ex ante, investors may then refrain from
buying the shares in the corporations even if the corporate charters
offer them strong protection of their rights at the time of their
investment. This commitment problem would deter investment or at
least raise the cost of outside capital when a corporation is
established.
In economic terms, different charter amendment rules give rise
to different levels of decision-making costs and external costs.
Decision-making costs include the costs that shareholders incur in
participating in collective decisions and the costs that arise because
of the problem of holdout.6 Shareholders participating in collective
decisions need to spend time and resources in evaluating the
decision, which impose a direct cost on them while the benefits are
4
See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b) (2019), [https://perma.cc/H5RH-B5JA];
Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 283 (Eng.), [https://perma.cc/B9WD-KJ7J].
5
At a publicly held company, unanimity requires not just the consent of all
shareholders, but all potential shareholders in the world, who could buy a single
share to block the transaction. Shareholders may agree to a rule of supermajority
vote, which requires a three fourths majority vote of share. Under this
arrangement, shareholders holding more than a quarter of shares can block the
amendment to the corporate charter. These shareholders may hold out the
amendment to obtain more benefits. William J. Carney, Fundamental Corporate
Changes, Minority Shareholders, and Business Purposes, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 69,
79-82.
6
See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 9899 (1962). Decision-making costs arise here because normally a bargaining range
will exist, and, recognizing this, each individual will seek to secure the maximum
gains possible for himself while keeping the net gains to his partners in the
agreement to the minimum. Each individual will be led to try to conceal his own
true preferences from the others in order to secure a greater share of the ‘surplus’
expected to be created from the choice being carried out.
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to be shared by all shareholders. Thus, they may lack incentive to
participate and choose to free-ride on the efforts of others. For those
who participate, each shareholder has incentive to hold out the
decision until he gains more from the bargain even though the
amendment is in the interest of the corporation.7 A high procedural
threshold for amending a charter provision incurs relatively high
decision-making costs, which affect the adaptability of a corporate
charter because shareholders may be unable to approve an
amendment that is beneficial to all shareholders. Meanwhile,
external costs are the social costs that arise because corporate
insiders or controlling shareholders may make an amendment that
benefit themselves at the expense of shareholders as a group.8 It
results from the so-called “opportunistic amendment problem”—
insiders of a corporation may amend the corporate charter to
enhance their power or even entrench themselves after shareholders
join the corporation, harming the interests of shareholders.9 A low
threshold for charter amendment gives rise to relatively high
external costs, which may deter investment ex ante because of the
insiders’ inability to make a commitment to investors that they would
not amend the charter in a way that harms shareholders.
Different charter amendment rules incur different degrees of
external and decision-making costs. As the size of the vote required
to approve an amendment increases and the procedural constraints
on the amendment are tightened, decision-making costs rise while
external costs decline. 10 This theory suggests that different
provisions in a corporate charter should be subject to different
amendment rules.11 When the amendment involves provisions that
are relatively trivial, shareholders may make an amendment
decision by a simple majority vote or simply delegate the decision
7
See Zohar Goshen, Controlling Strategic Voting: Property Rule or Liability Rule,
70 S. CAL. L. REV. 741, 751 (1997) (“In the case of a holdout, however, the securities
holder who withholds her vote does so in order to reap an additional profit as a
result of her support at a later, more critical stage.”).
8
BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 45-46.
9
See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 1549, 1573-75 (1989) (discussing the benefits of eliminating opportunistic
amendment through mandatory rules).
10
See BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 74 (making a similar argument
in considering the economics of constitution). See also infra Section 1.2. (discussing
these issues in greater detail).
11
Id. at 73 (“All potential governmental or collective activity should not be
organized through the operation of the same decision-making rule.”).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss2/4

2019]

Corporate Charter Amendment Rules

435

to the board of directors. For more important provisions,
shareholders may set a supermajority rule, for example, a three
fourths majority rule, for amending these provisions. When it comes
to the amendment of provisions that fundamentally alter
shareholders’ rights, shareholders should choose a unanimity rule,
in which case shareholders cannot amend these provisions without
unanimous consent of all shareholders, or a mandatory rule, which
prevents the charter provision from being amended.
The theoretical framework of external and decision-making
costs explains why different states have adopted different charter
amendment rules.12 Corporate laws in different jurisdictions need
to achieve a different balance between external costs and decisionmaking costs. In jurisdictions where external costs are the major
concern, corporate laws are likely to set up a high threshold for
charter amendment. 13 Where external costs can be effectively
controlled by other mechanisms and decision-making costs are the
major concern, corporate laws may adopt a relatively low threshold
for charter amendment.14 This Article identifies two major factors
that may affect the magnitudes of external costs and decisionmaking costs in a given state: institutional investors and judicial
capacity. Given the different roles played by institutional investors
and the different capacity of courts in different states, the same
charter amendment rule may incur different levels of external and
decision-making costs, rendering the same rule efficient in some
states but not in others.
For example, the three fourths majority rule in the U.K. can be
explained by the fact that decision-making costs for shareholder
voting are relatively lower than other major jurisdictions because
institutional investors play an active role in corporate governance in
the U.K. and the free-rider problem is less severe. 15 A second
12
While scholars have long noticed this difference, current theories have
failed to provide an adequate explanation. For example, the widely accepted
distinction between civil law and common law does not explain the drastic
difference between the law in U.K. and the state of Delaware. Rock et al. mentioned
the differences but did not offer any explanation. Edward Rock et al., Fundamental
Changes, in REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH, 186-87, 222-24 (2009) (explaining
possible alternative structural explanations for the difference between U.K. and
Delaware corporation laws).
13
See infra Section 2.1.
14
See infra Section 2.1.
15
See infra Section 2.1.
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example might be the state of Delaware. The simple majority rule
adopted in the state of Delaware can be explained by the fact that
courts in Delaware are highly capable of detecting opportunistic
actions and play a major role in protecting shareholders from
opportunistic amendment decisions initiated by corporate
insiders. 16 Thus, external costs are relatively unimportant for
corporations in Delaware. The bilateral veto regime in Delaware
could be viewed as an effort to reduce decision-making costs
compared to the supermajority rule by lowering the threshold for
shareholder approval and delegating the power to the board of
directors.
The theoretical framework of external and decision-making
costs also provides a new explanation for mandatory rules in
corporate law, which has long been a subject of academic interest.17
Currently, the most influential theory about mandatory rules in
corporate law is the “opportunistic amendment hypothesis”
proposed by Jeffrey Gordon. 18 Corporate insiders or controlling
shareholders may amend the charter in the midstream to enhance

See infra Section 2.1.
See infra Section 2.2.
18
Gordon, supra note 9 at 1573 (arguing that mandatory law provides
insurance against opportunistic amendments that take advantage of incomplete
corporate contracts).
This “opportunistic amendment” problem has been
recognized as a major justification for mandatory rules in corporate law. Roberta
Romano, Answering the Wrong Question: the Tenuous Case for Mandatory Corporate
Laws, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1599, 1606 (1989) (questioning the validity of the
“opportunistic amendment” problem as an explanation for the mechanics of
corporate law); Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial? A Political and Economic
Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 566 (1990) (analyzing that charter amendments may
increase shareholder wealth without maximizing it because managers seek their
own benefits from such amendments); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Foreword: The Debate
on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, COLUM. L. REV. 1395, 1401 (1989)
(suggesting possible alternative procedures to implement charter amendments).
See also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1461, 1461(1989) (arguing that there are certain constitutive rules, including
distributional rules, structural rules, and fiduciary rules, that should be made
mandatory). The problems of shareholder voting in amending corporate charters
also led many corporations to adopt the default rules offered by states. See generally
Henry Hansmann, Corporation and Contract, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1 (2006); Yair
Listokin, What do Corporate Default Rules and Menus do? An Empirical Examination, 6
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 279-308 (2009) (examining empirical evidence of the
impact of corporate anti-takeover enabling statutes).
16
17
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their power at the expense of outside shareholders.19 This theory,
however, cannot explain why corporations are allowed to adopt
takeover defenses which may harm the interests of shareholders and
benefit corporate insiders.20 The theory in this Article suggests that
the opportunistic amendment hypothesis is incomplete because it
focuses entirely on external costs and ignores the associated
decision-making costs.21 Although mandatory rules eliminate the
danger of opportunistic amendment, they harm the adaptability of
corporate charters and thus incur decision-making costs. 22 Still,
mandatory rules are not always in the best interests of outside
shareholders faced with an opportunistic amendment problem. 23
This theory can better explain why mandatory rules vary across
jurisdictions, and over time, the factors that affect the external costs
and decision-making costs change.
This theory also explains the procedural requirements imposed
on the exercise of appraisal rights and why the appraisal remedy has
played a more important role in the United States.24 Scholars have
noticed that in many jurisdictions, corporate law imposes strict
procedures on the exercise of appraisal rights, which is usually
costly for the dissenting shareholders.25 In addition, the valuation
19
Shareholders generally do not have fiduciary duty towards the corporation
and can maximize their own welfare. See J.A.C. Hetherington, Defining the Scope of
Controlling Shareholder’s Fiduciary Responsibilities, 22 WAKE FOREST L. REV., 9, 12
(1987) (“Finally, the initial burden of fiduciary obligations rests on corporate
officials…Shareholders, on the other hand, have traditionally been said to owe no
fiduciary obligations to each other”).
20
Romano, supra note 18, at 1606 (“ [T]here are no mandatory laws preventing
such activity[the adoption of takeover defenses].”).
21
See infra Section 2.2.
22
See infra Section 2.2.
23
See infra Section 2.2.
24
For examples of current studies, see Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s
Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 237-38 (1962) (explaining
the mechanisms used to exercise appraisal remedies); Paul G. Mahoney & Mark
Weinstein, The Appraisal Remedy and Merger Premiums, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV., 239,
243-45 (1999) (describing the theories surrounding the role of appraisal); Robert B.
Thompson, Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal’s Role in Corporate Law, 84
GEO. L.J. 1, 11-12 (1995) (tracing the historical flux of appraisal in business).
25
See Manning supra note 24, (describing the respective bargaining position
of dissenting shareholders); see also Elliott J. Weiss; Lawrence J. White, Of
Econometrics and Indeterminacy: A Study of Investors’ Reactions to Changes in Corporate
Law, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 551, 596 (1987) (“The procedural complexity and the cost of
seeking appraisal, combined with the courts’ use of valuation methods that
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of the fair value of stocks is often uncertain and unpredictable,
determined on a case-by-case basis by courts with careful
consideration of the wrongdoings of the majority shareholders. 26
This Article suggests that the goal of the appraisal remedy is not
simply to protect the interests of the minority but also to achieve a
balance between external and decision-making costs. 27 If the
exercise of appraisal remedy becomes costless for dissenting
shareholders, many dissenting shareholders may employ this
remedy to hold out corporate changes that benefit shareholders as a
whole to extract private benefits. This Article suggests that these
provided most dissenting shareholders with scant hope of obtaining satisfactory
relief, made appraisal a ‘remedy of desperation.’”). For earlier discussion, see
Comment, The Doctrine of Strict Priority in Corporate Recapitalization, 54 YALE L.J. 840,
845 (1945) (listing the weaknesses associated with appraisal rights); Note, Appraisal
of Corporate Dissenters’ Shares: Apportioning the Proceeding’s Financial Burdens, 60
YALE L.J. 337, 340-343 (1951) (specifying the financial burdens associated with
appraisal proceedings that frustrate their compensatory purpose); Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on
Charter Amendments, HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1854 (1989) (explaining the effect of
appraisals on manager decision-making); Note, Interplay of Rights of Stockholders
Dissenting from Sale of Corporate Assets, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 251, 254 (1958):
Appraisal supposedly protects the stockholder from any monetary loss
which he would sustain by submission to the dictates of the majority.
There is, however, criticism of its efficacy, based on the realization that the
appraised value of the stock is not always its real or full worth. Since it is
probably impossible to derive any method which would always be
accurate in arriving at a value fair to all, the availability of relief other than
appraisal is often of utmost importance.
26
See Barry M. Wertheimer, The Shareholders’ Appraisal Remedy and How Courts
Determine Fair Value, DUKE L.J. 680, fn. 339 (showing that courts often reach
appraisal values far greater than those offered by corporations); Cavalier Oil Corp.
v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989) (upholding a higher appraisal value than
proposed by the corporation); In re Radiology Assocs., Inc., 611 A.2d 485 (Del. Ch.
1991) (awarding a larger appraisal value to the plaintiff after court evaluation of
appraisal methods); Neal v. Alabama By-Products Corp., No. CIV.A.8282, 1990 WL
109243, at *1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 1, 1990) (assigning a higher value for shareholders than
initially offered by the corporation). In other jurisdictions, the application of
appraisal rights also depends on a case-by-case basis. See Alan K. Koh, Appraising
Japan’s Appraisal Remedy, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 417, 434 (2014) (outlining alternative
methods for appraisal used in corporations in Japan); Hideki Kanda, Saul Levmore,
The Appraisal Remedy and the Goals of Corporate Law, 32 UCLA L. REV. 429, 433 (1985)
(“it is designed to accomplish the ‘discovery goal,’ explained in Part I as essentially
a goal allowing shareholders to use the appraisal remedy to uncover possible
managerial misbehavior.”).
27
James Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder’s Appraisal Right,
77 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1216-17 (1964) (stating that, appraisal rights need to balance
“the relative dangers of oppression by the majority and harassment by the
minority.”).
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procedural burdens and uncertainty might be necessary in
balancing these two costs and that proposals to alleviate the burdens
on dissenting shareholders in exercising their appraisal rights may
not always be socially desirable.28
The above theory also has important implications on the debate
of increasing shareholder power in the United States. Currently,
some scholars argue that the bilateral veto regime generates a bias
towards the status quo that benefits managers of the corporation at
the expense of shareholders’ interests.29 Others disagree and point
out that delegating power to the board of directors benefits
shareholders. 30 This Article provides a new perspective to this
debate. The bilateral veto regime offers additional protection to
shareholders by setting up an additional barrier of approval by the
board of directors.31 If, for example, the state of Delaware shifts to a
unitary veto regime and allows shareholders to initiate charter
amendment with a simple majority vote of share, decision-making
costs would be reduced because shareholders can now make
amendments with fewer procedural constraints but external costs
may rise. Shareholders individually or collectively holding a
majority of shares may adopt provisions in the corporate charter that
benefit them at the expense of other shareholders.32 Thus, the power
28
Many scholars believe that the procedural costs imposed on dissenting
shareholders in the exercise of appraisal rights should be alleviated. See, e.g.,
Wertheimer, supra note 26 at 708; Robert B. Thompson, Squeeze-Out Mergers and the
New Appraisal Remedy, 62 WASH. U. L. Q. 415, 432 (1984) (“The Delaware court has
carved out an ambitious goal for the appraisal process; but appraisal may not be
able to protect the minority without legislative changes.”); Joel Seligman,
Reappraising the Appraisal Remedy, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 829, 831 (1984) (“This
Article begins by analyzing the basic defects in current state appraisal proceedings:
the stock market exception, the methods of valuation, and the procedures and
costs.”).
29
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 833, 862 (2004).
30
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 1739 (2002); Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire,
Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law and Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV.
767, 791 (2017).
31
BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 233; ROBERT D. COOTER, THE
STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 187 (2000).
32
Consider a hostile takeover for example. A bilateral veto regime requires
the approval of both the board of directors and shareholders. Thus, when a hostile
acquirer obtains a majority voting rights, it still cannot approve a merger
transaction without the support of the board of directors. Such a bilateral veto
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of the board of directors should be viewed together with the simple
majority rule in Delaware and any proposal to change the current
rule needs to consider both external and decision-making costs.
Another fundamental question in the academic literature of
corporate law is to what extent law is important in corporate
governance. If a corporation is merely a “nexus of contracts,” why
are shareholders unable to decide all the terms in a corporate
charter? 33 Current studies have not fully analyzed this question
from a comparative law perspective. 34 This Article argues that law
plays a larger role in corporate governance in some jurisdictions
regime enhances the difficulty of a merger and may prevent a hostile acquirer from
passing a resolution of merger that does not benefit all shareholders and increases
the premium that target shareholders can obtain. If a unilateral veto regime is
adopted, a hostile acquirer may easily obtain control of a corporation and approve
a merger transaction that may not benefit shareholders as a whole. See John C.
Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the
Tender Offer’s Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1175 (1984)
(arguing that the benefit of auction contests depends on whether the ex post or ex
ante perspective is used for analysis); Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, The
Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1161, 1169 (1981). The Delaware Court usually allows the board of directors to
adopt takeover defenses in hostile takeovers to promote shareholder welfare as
long as the defenses meet the Unocal test. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A.2d 946, 956 (Del. 1985) (upholding a selective exchange offer that protects the
substantial value of minority shareholder value). See also Air Products and Chemicals,
Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48 (2011) (affirming a board offer as adequate in price
and not structurally coercive). Recent studies have shown that a staggered board
enhances shareholder welfare. K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, The
Shareholder Value of Empowered Boards, 68 STAN. L. REV. 67, 80 (2016).
33
The contractarian view is famously proposed by Frank Easterbrook and
Daniel Fischel. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control
Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 698-737 (1982); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 395-427 (1983).
34
Current studies have not provided a full account of why mandatory rules
vary across countries. John Coffee first argued that the balance between enabling
and mandatory rules shifts over time and varies across jurisdictions, depending on
the competence of the judicial system. John C. Coffee, Jr., Mandatory/Enabling
Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1620
(1989). Moreover, as this Article will show, while John Coffee is certainly correct
that judicial capacity will affect mandatory rules, other factors, including for
example, the presence of institutional investors, may also potentially affect the level
of mandatory rules in corporate law. After John Coffee pointed out the importance
of a comparative perspective, few studies have explored the mandatory rules in
various jurisdictions. Although there are a few scholars who consider different
options to shareholder protection from a comparative law perspective, their
analysis is not focused on charter amendment. See, e.g., Priya P. Lele & Mathias M.
Siems, Shareholder Protection: A Leximetric Approach, 7 J. CORP. L. STUDIES 17, 17 (2007)
(explaining an EU Commission proposal to harmonize shareholder rights).
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while contract plays a larger role in other jurisdictions. Whether law
or contract plays a dominant role depends on the relative strength
of different institutions. 35 Where shareholders can vote with
relatively low decision-making costs and where legislative and
litigation costs are high, it is more efficient for shareholders to make
their own “contract” at will. 36 Where courts and legislatures are
sophisticated, however, law can protect the interests of shareholders
at lower costs.37 Corporations can then delegate the tasks of charter
amendment to the state legislature and courts,38 which may reduce
the external costs and decision-making costs associated with
shareholder voting. Viewing judicial intervention this way deepens
our understanding of the role of corporate law in corporate
governance.39
This Article proceeds as follows. Section 1 develops a
constitutional economic theory of corporate charter amendment
rules. It argues that different charter amendment rules incur
different levels of external and decision-making costs. It also
identifies the major factors that affect the magnitude of these costs
in different jurisdictions. Section 2 applies this theory to explaining
the variation in charter amendment rules across jurisdictions,
including the state of Delaware, the U.K., Germany and France, and
providing a new account of mandatory rules and appraisal rights in
corporate law. Section 3 considers the policy implications of this
theory on the design of mandatory rules in corporate law, especially
in emerging economies, and the implications on theoretical debates
about increasing shareholder power and the role of law in corporate
governance.
1.

A CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMIC THEORY FOR CORPORATE
CHARTER AMENDMENT

A corporate charter is the constitution of the corporation, which
lays out the rules governing the corporate decision-making process.
See infra Section 3.3.
See infra Section 3.3.
37
See infra Section 3.3.
38
Hansmann, supra note 3, at 9.
39
Some scholars argue that corporate law is trivial, and corporations can
always select their desired level of corporate governance. Black, supra note 18.
35
36
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When shareholders invest in a corporation, they all agree to a
corporate charter. However, circumstances may arise that demand
the corporate charter be amended. The constitutional economic
theory, developed by Buchanan, has been successful in explaining
constitution and constitutional amendment. The theory also helps
analyze the social costs of different charter amendment rules in
corporate law.
1.1. An Economic Theory of Constitution and Constitutional
Amendment
A corporate charter is often referred to as the constitution of a
corporation. 40 Similar to the constitution of a state, a corporate
charter contains rules governing different decisions of a
corporation. 41 Buchanan and Tullock famously developed a
constitutional economic theory about the design of constitutional
rules. 42 They argue that in devising a constitution, individuals
submit certain activities to be collectively decided while leaving
others in the private realm.43 In making such decisions, members
need to consider two costs—external costs and decision-making
costs.

40
Corporate charters can better be termed “corporate constitutions” rather
than “corporate contracts,” since the amendment of a contract needs consent of all
parties to a contract, but a constitution does not need a unanimous vote to be
amended. As scholars have long noticed, corporate law and constitutional law
share many similarities. See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, Assault on Another Citadel:
Attempts to Curtail the Fiduciary Standard of Loyalty Applicable to Corporate Directors,
57 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 377 (1988) (stating that the “parallels between economic
and political associations are numerous enough to warrant a comparison.”).
41
A corporate charter may include rules governing a related-party
transaction, the issuance of stocks, and procedures of a shareholder meeting.
42
See BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6.
43
BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 45. See also STEPHEN HOLMES,
PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 173 (Univ. of
Chicago Press 1995) (“A liberal constitutional framework is a classic solution to a
collective action problem. People may voluntarily relinquish their ability to choose
(in some matters) in order to accomplish their will (in other matters). Collective
self-binding can therefore be an instrument of collective self-rule.”).
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External costs arise because some members may dictate a
decision that benefits them at the expense of the dissenters.44 Since
certain decisions are made by other members of the collective, each
individual loses part of the control over the decision and thus
becomes potentially subject to the tyranny of the majority. Some of
the members may thus make a decision benefiting themselves even
though the decision harms all members as a whole.
Collective decision-making also incurs decision-making costs,
both direct and indirect. 45 Participating in the collective decision
necessarily incurs time and expenses, which impose direct costs on
members in a charter amendment process.46 In addition, collective
decision-making may give rise to indirect costs because of the
problem of strategic voting. Members may vote based on how
others behave rather than based on their true preferences.
Specifically, members may strategically holdout in order to get more
private benefits.47 Consequently, decisions that benefit the state as
a whole may be delayed or blocked, which adversely affect the
welfare of all members of a state.
Suppose State A faces an invasion from State B, and suppose that
the constitution of State A requires any declaration and action of war
to be approved by a two-third majority vote of all citizens in that
state. Such a constitutional rule is likely to incur significant
decision-making costs—not only because each individual must
undertake the costs and time to vote, but also because the vote may
delay necessary action. Some citizens may even opportunistically
holdout the decision by withholding their consent in order to extort
personal benefits. Due to participation costs and the holdout
44
BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 45 (External costs are “costs that the
individual expects to endure as a result of the actions of others over which he has
no direct control.”).
45
BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 99 (“Each individual will be led to
try to conceal his own true preferences from the others in order to secure a greater
share of the ‘surplus’ expected to be created from the choice being carried out.”).
46
BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 99:

[L]ooking backward from a decision once made, everyone in the group
will be able to see that he would have been better off had the investment
in ‘bargaining’ not taken place at all provided an agreement could have
been reached in some manner without bargaining . . . .One method of
eliminating bargaining costs is to delegate decision-making authority to a
single individual and agree to abide by the choices that he makes for the
whole group.
47

Goshen, supra note 7, at 751.
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problem, citizens of State A may take a long time to make a decision,
during which time State B may have gained a strategic edge.48
The optimal design of constitutional rules would seek to
minimize the sum of external and decision-making costs, which
Buchanan and Tullock refer to as “interdependence costs.” 49
According to Buchanan and Tullock, members of a state are likely to
select different decision-making rules for different activities in
designing a new constitution. 50 The magnitude of external costs
significantly depends on the extent of impact the decision may have
on each individual, while the magnitude of decision-making costs
depends on the procedure and the voting rules for the decision.51
For most legislative activities of governments, members are likely to
choose a majority rule.52 In considering the constitutional rules on
more important issues such as property rights and human rights,
however, individuals will likely require a supermajority or complete
unanimity. As they foresee that collective actions will impose
significant external costs on them, the reduction in external costs far
outweighs the increase in decision-making costs caused by these
rules.53
To illustrate, let us consider two decisions made by a state: to
expropriate a piece of land and to enact a new environmental law.
The expropriation of land affects the property rights of the
landowner without the owner’s consent. The external costs incurred
by the owner are likely to be more significant compared to the
external costs on a person who disagrees with the enactment of the
new environmental law. Thus, even if a majority of the state
legislators supports the expropriation of the private land, a state
constitution is likely to impose additional requirements on the
decision to prevent the “tyranny of the majority.”54 Meanwhile, a
Id.
BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 46.
50
BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 73-74.
51
Id.
52 Id. at 313.
53
Id. at 73-74.
54
For example, the Fifth Amendment of the United States provides that “nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S.
CONST. AMEND. V. This taking clause applies to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Although courts in the United States have generally adopted a
deferential standard of review of the exercise of the eminent domain power by
legislatures, judicial review nonetheless enhances the costs of governments
48
49
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legislative majority is likely to be sufficient for the enactment of a
new environmental law given that such decision is likely to incur
relatively low external costs on the dissenters.
The above analysis of the design of constitutional rules also
applies to the rules governing constitutional amendment. A
constitution contains rules that set out the conditions for making
various decisions by a state. The rules governing the decision to
amend a constitution is one of these decisions and thus is usually
included in a constitution. From the perspective of a law and
economic theory, the amendment of a constitution is a decision
made by the state, which also incurs external and decision-making
costs. For efficiency, rules governing the constitutional amendment
process should be designed to minimize interdependency costs.
An important implication of the economic theory is that the
amendment clause in a constitution should not be the only
mechanism to amend the constitution.
For example, the
Constitution of the United States provides an amendment procedure
in Article V, which states that “[t]he Congress, whenever two thirds
of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments
to this Constitution.”55 This, however, is not the only way to amend
the Constitution. 56 For example, the commerce clause in the
Constitution of the United States had a very different meaning prior
to and after the New Deal. Bruce Ackerman has documented how
the United States changed its constitution with and without using
Article V. 57 The theoretical framework of external and decisionmaking costs further suggests that the constitution of a state should
expropriating private property. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)
(deciding in an 8-0 decision that the government may take private property under
the 5th Amendment Takings Clause for a public purpose with just compensation);
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (“one person's property
may not be taken for the benefit of another private person without a justifying
public purpose, even though compensation be paid”); Thomas W. Merrill,
Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 63, 81 (1986) (the “courts, in setting
the limits of eminent domain, should ensure that just compensation is paid and
enforce the due process ‘tax’—the legislative and constitutional requirements that
push the administrative costs of eminent domain above the costs of market
exchange in thick market settings.”).
55
U.S. Const. art. V.
56
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, VOLUME 2: TRANSFORMATIONS 28, 29
(1998) (suggesting that the People can undertake decisions if they wish to revise
their Constitution: “Normal Americans have a right to assert their constitutional
will in politics without making this project their life’s work.”).
57
See generally id.
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be amended by a variety of approaches in order to reduce the social
costs involved in constitutional amendments. As Ackerman
observes, a formalistic understanding of Article V would create two
dangers—“false positives” and “false negatives”: a constitutional
amendment may not occur even when the People have spoken; or,
a constitutional amendment may take place even when the People
do not intend so.58 For certain important provisions that involve the
fundamental human rights and property interests of individuals,
even a supermajority rule should not be able to amend them.59 For
trivial issues, however, going through the constitutional
amendment process may sometimes be too burdensome, which
hurts the adaptability of the constitution.60 When only trivial issues
are involved, a more convenient way to amend a constitution might
be for courts to change the interpretation of the constitution.
An example is the constitutional amendment rule itself. Scholars
have long recognized the importance of constitutional amendment
rules.
Akhil Amar argues that amendment rules “are of
unsurpassed importance, for these rules define the conditions under
which all other constitutional norms may be legally displaced.” 61
The power of amendment is sometimes regarded as an “incident of
sovereignty” since it is equivalent to the power of making a new
constitution. 62 Ulrich Preuss also recognizes that the amending
power “is necessary to preserve the flexibility and sustainability of
the constitutional order, but it can destroy it by amending the
constitution in an anti-constitutional tenor.” 63 As a result, some
scholars argue that the constitutional amendment rule should not be
subject to the same constitutional amendment procedure as other
rules contained in a constitution.64

Id. at 29.
BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 73.
60
BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 64.
61
Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment
outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 461 (1994).
62
Suber, Amendment, in The Philosophy of Law: An Encyclopedia 31, 32
(Christopher Berry Gray ed., 2013).
63
Ulrich K. Preuss, The Implications of “Eternity Clauses”: The German
Experience, 44 ISR. L. REV. 429, 430 (2011).
64
Frank I. Michelman, Thirteen Easy Pieces, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1297, 1303-1304,
n. 27 (1995) (“[P]erhaps the idea of a constitution requires absolute entrenchment
of an amendment rule, which in turn at least relatively entrenches everything
else.”).
58
59
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1.2. Applying the Constitutional Economic Theory to Analyze
Corporate Charter Amendment
While Buchanan and Tullock mainly address issues of
constitutional law, they recognize that “the conclusions are
generally applicable to a wide variety of collective institutions.”65
This Article makes the first attempt to apply this theory to study
corporations. 66 One of the major functions of a corporation is to
aggregate the wealth of many people so that they can conduct
businesses that each individual shareholder cannot. Thus, investors
must give up some control once they invest in a corporation.
Meanwhile, shareholders will not completely forgo their control
since corporate managers or controlling shareholders may abuse
their power to benefit themselves rather than using the corporate
resources to maximize shareholder welfare.
In fact, the theoretical framework developed by Buchanan and
Tullock can better explain corporate law since the framework is
based on a model in which an individual is “assumed to be
motivated by a desire to further his own interest, to maximize his
expected utility.”67 This assumption works well when it comes to
decisions of shareholders.
Although shareholders may be
concerned with other values, most of them intend to further their
own interests by obtaining investment returns.68
One may raise an important objection to the analogy between
constitutional law and corporate law: when shareholders join a
corporation, they actually consent, at least implicitly, to the

BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 119.
BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 64. The similarities between a
corporate constitution and a state constitution have long been recognized. See, e.g.,
Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Corporate Constitutionalism: Antitakeover Charter
Provisions as Precommitment, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 473-522 (2003); ROBERT A. G. MONKS
& NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 140 (2008) (“Shareholders were seen as
voters, boards of directors as elected representatives, proxy solicitations as election
campaigns, corporate charters and bylaws as constitutions and amendments.”).
67
BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 119.
68
While corporations also have other constituencies, such as employees,
consumers, and creditors, they usually do not have a say in the corporate charters.
Reinier Kraakman & Henry Hansmann, The End of History for Corporate Law, in
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 49-78 (2017). When we discuss constitutional law,
however, a citizen may have other values.
65
66
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corporate charter.69 In contrast, actual consent is usually difficult to
obtain in the context of the constitution of a state—one may be borne
in a state without having a chance to consent to its constitution.
However, in the context of corporate charter amendments,
unanimous consent by all shareholders of a public corporation is
also not possible in most circumstances.70 Thus, the amendment of
corporate charter faces the same problem as the problem of lacking
actual unanimous consent in constitutional law. Courts and
legislatures can no longer rely on the actual unanimous consent of
shareholders due to the problem of holdout, but must “calculate”
the consent of shareholders based on theoretical reasoning.71 Since
actual voting is tainted with opportunism and oppression,
legislatures and courts must consider what the choice of
shareholders would have been had they been put behind a “veil of
ignorance” without knowing whether they are the controlling
shareholder or the dissenting ones.72 The framework developed by
Buchanan and Tullock is thus important in analyzing the charter
amendment rules.
Another objection to this analogy may be that while democracy
assigns one vote to each citizen, shareholders holding a larger share
in a corporation are assigned more voting rights than shareholders
holding a smaller stake. This Article contends, however, that the
constitutional economic theory developed by Buchanan and Tullock
still applies to corporate voting. Shareholders with a larger stake in
a corporation have a stronger incentive to participate in corporate
governance since they can reap more benefits from good
performance of the corporation. 73 Thus, their consent can better
represent the interests of all shareholders compared to shareholders
who only hold a tiny bit of shares. I will further illustrate this point
in Section 2.
69
Of course, there are still limited circumstances in which an individual
inherits the shares without actually agreeing to the charter of the corporation. In
these cases, one can still more easily sell the shares than one can leave a state.
70
Most jurisdictions allow a corporation to amend the charter without
unanimous vote.
See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b) (2019),
[https://perma.cc/H5RH-B5JA]; Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 283 (Eng.),
[https://perma.cc/B9WD-KJ7J].
71
Hansmann, supra note 3, at 2.
72
BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 78.
73
Daniel R. Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class
Common Stock, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 119, 135 (1987).
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1.3. Economic Analysis of Different Corporate Charter Amendment
Rules within a Jurisdiction
Different rules governing the amendment of corporate charters
also incur a different level of external costs and decision-making
costs. The tradeoff between external and decision-making costs
reflects the inevitable tradeoff between two needs—commitment and
adaptability.74 If corporation can easily make an amendment to its
charter, external costs would be high because some shareholders
may amend the charter when it does not benefit all shareholders.
From an ex ante perspective, corporations may find it more difficult
to raise equity funding since corporate insiders or controlling
shareholders cannot make a credible commitment not to amend the
rules in the midstream. If, however, the amendment to a charter is
too difficult, decision-making costs are high. This prevents the
charter from adapting to new circumstances when it benefits all
shareholders, although it preserves the original commitment made
by all shareholders.
Scholars have long identified an “opportunistic amendment
problem” when a corporation amends its charter. 75 Corporate
insiders have strong incentives to enhance their power by amending
corporate charters at the expense of outside shareholders whose
capital is “locked in.” 76 Even if such amendments have been
approved by shareholders, the approval may be tainted with
coercion or conflicts of interests.77 For example, a corporation can
devise a “draconian” takeover defense that renders hostile takeovers
realistically impossible. This would harm the interests of the
shareholders while enabling management to entrench themselves.78
If the threshold for charter amendment is set too low, the problem
74
Ronald Gilson has made a similar distinction. See Ronald J. Gilson,
Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When do Institutions Matter?, 74 WASH.
U. L. Q. 327, 342 (1996).
75
Gordon, supra note 9, at 1573.
76
The major conflict in a charter amendment is between corporate insiders
(managers and the controlling shareholder) and outside shareholders. See Rock et
al., supra note 12, at 190.
77
Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 1474.
78
Delaware prohibits such defenses. See, e.g., Unitrin, Inc. v. American
General Corp. 651 A.2d 1384 (Del. 1995) (reversing the lower court’s ruling because
a company’s hostile takeover should have been reviewed using enhanced scrutiny
of its “draconian” actions); Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 956.
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of opportunistic amendment may give rise to high external costs.79
A high threshold can alleviate the danger that a part of the
shareholders can amend the corporate charter to benefit themselves
at the expense of all shareholders.80
Meanwhile, a corporation may exist for a long time. 81
Circumstances may change, resulting in the need to adjust the
charter to reflect these changes. 82 A high threshold for charter
amendment incurs high decision-making costs, including the direct
costs of shareholders participating in the voting process and indirect
costs of shareholders failing to approve an amendment beneficial to
the corporation because of the problem of holdout.83 Suppose that a
corporation requires any amendment to its charter to be approved
by unanimous vote of share. Each shareholder thus has a veto
power for the amendment of a corporate charter. Each has an
incentive to withhold its consent unless she receives some more
personal benefits. If all shareholders adopt this strategy, the
amendment would fail even when the amendment would benefit
shareholders as a whole.84
Different charter amendment requirements, including a majority
vote of share, a supermajority vote of share, a vote by disinterested
shareholders, a unanimous vote, or mandatory rules, achieve a
different balance between these two goals and are associated with a
different level of external costs and decision-making costs.
1. Different shareholder voting rules—To illustrate the different
external and decision-making costs associated with different charter
amendment rules, let us first consider a supermajority rule. A
supermajority rule sets up a barrier to shareholders or insiders
hoping to opportunistically amend the corporate charter to enhance

BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 64.
Id.
81
Hansmann, supra note 3, at 1.
82
Gilson, supra note 74, at 332.
83
Goshen, supra note 7, at 751; BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 98
(“Decision-making costs arise here because normally a bargaining range will exist,
and, recognizing this, each individual will seek to secure the maximum gains
possible for himself while keeping the net gains to his partners in the agreement to
the minimum.”).
84
See Goshen & Squire, supra note 30, at 791.
79
80
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their power or strengthen their positions. 85 The difficulty of
approving an amendment to the corporate charter depends on the
threshold.86 The higher the threshold for approval, the lower the
external costs become.87 If shareholders holding 99% of the shares
of a corporation all agree to a merger transaction, the danger that
such a transaction would cause harm to the rest of the shareholders
becomes much smaller than in a case where only shareholders with
51% of the voting shares agree. The problem with raising the voting
requirement, however, is the increase in decision-making costs—
shareholders may also attempt to obtain more benefits by “holding
up” the approval of amendment, even when such an amendment is
beneficial for all shareholders. Thus, if the threshold for approving
a proposal is set too high, many beneficial amendments may be
thwarted.
It is also possible for shareholders to delegate the power to
amend the corporate charter to shareholders holding less than 50%
of shares. For example, a corporation may delegate the power to the
board of directors88 to amend its corporate charter. In that case, the
controlling shareholder would have the ultimate say on the
amendment. Moreover, in some jurisdictions, shareholders can
choose to adopt a dual-class share structure—a class of shareholders
can possess the control rights of the corporation while the other class
of shareholders can only obtain financial interests.89 Shareholders
who purchase these non-voting shares essentially delegate the
decision-making rights to those holding voting shares. These rules
would incur higher external costs because the board or the
shareholders may not always act in the best interests of all
shareholders.90 But it would probably incur relatively low decisionmaking costs.91

85
A majority or minority vote or a vote by disinterested shareholders can also
raise the barrier for shareholder voting.
86
A disinterested shareholder approval may also increase the difficulty of
approving an amendment.
87
BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 64.
88
Whose members are mainly nominated and appointed by the controlling
shareholder.
89
Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision,
125 YALE L.J. 560, 563 (2015).
90 Id. at 566.
91
BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 64.
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For any given charter provision, as the size of the vote required
to amend it increases, decision-making costs rise but external costs
decline.92 Decision-making costs are likely to rise at an increasing
rate.93 This is because as the size of the required vote increases, the
market becomes “thinner,” and the bargaining power of the
remaining shareholders becomes stronger, leading to a more severe
holdout problem. When shareholders adopt an unanimity rule,
every single shareholder can thwart the decision, in which case the
decision-making costs would be enormous.94

92
93
94

BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 64.
Id. at 68-69.
Id. at 60, 69.
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Figure 1: Decision-Making Costs and the Size of the Vote Required
for Charter Amendment

Social Costs

Decision-making
costs

Delegation to the board
of directors/ majority
vote without a quorum
requirement/ Dual Class
Shareholding

Majority
vote

Supermajority
vote

Unanimous
vote

Size of the vote
required to take
certain action

Meanwhile, external costs are likely to decline as the size of the
vote required increases because if there are more shareholders
approving the decision, it becomes more likely that the decision
benefits all shareholders since they all have similar interests. When
the decision requires a unanimous vote, the external costs become
zero since each individual has the final say on whether the
amendment should take place. 95 Efficient rules for charter
amendment should thus minimize interdependency costs, i.e. the
aggregate of decision-making costs and external costs. 96 Many
corporations use a supermajority vote to amend their corporate
charters because it achieves a balance between decision-making
costs and external costs.97
Id. at 68.
Id. at 62.
97
This is similar to the analysis of decision-making rules in the design of a
constitution. BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 68.
95
96
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The above analysis suggests that a corporation should use
different rules for the amendment of different provisions. For
amendments that affect important interests of shareholders,
shareholders are likely to choose a higher threshold. For trivial
amendments, however, shareholders are likely to delegate the
decision to the board of directors or use a simple majority vote.
Consider, for example, the charter amendment rules in Delaware.98
In Delaware, the amendment of a corporation’s certificate of
incorporation requires a majority vote while the authority to amend
the bylaws, which contain provisions that are relatively less
important, can be delegated to the board of directors.99 Consider a
trivial provision that stipulates the number of days that
shareholders must be notified prior to a meeting. This provision
does not affect the interests of shareholders significantly. If there is
a sudden need for the corporation to change the period of
notification, the decision-making costs of amending this provision
would be too high if a majority vote is required. It may be more
efficient to delegate the amendment decision to the board of
directors. Although by delegating the decision to the board,
shareholders risk incurring higher external costs—the board may
not always act in the best interests of shareholders, the costs of doing
so would be relatively low compared to, say, a decision to issue new
stocks. Such a delegation is not likely to significantly raise external
costs since the matter is trivial and the potential dissenting
shareholders are not likely to suffer much loss. Thus, requiring the
corporation to use a single amendment rule for amending these
trivial provisions would be too costly. Meanwhile, there might be
provisions that are so fundamental to shareholders that even a
supermajority vote cannot duly protect minority shareholders, in
which case a unanimous rule may be more appropriate.
2. Mandatory Rules—Apart from the shareholder voting rules
discussed above, mandatory rules can also be viewed as charter
amendment rules. By treating some rules in corporate law as
mandatory, legislators prevent corporations from amending them
with a majority vote or a supermajority vote of shares. Mandatory
rules therefore incur much higher decision-making costs compared
to a majority or a supermajority rule because mandatory rules
98
99

DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1).
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss2/4

2019]

Corporate Charter Amendment Rules

455

prevent the charter from adapting to new circumstances. However,
to the extent that legislatures seek to promote shareholder welfare
and to curb the opportunistic amendment problem, mandatory rules
lower external costs. When legislatures make certain rules
mandatory, they may still be amended later when legislators amend
the corporate statutes. Mandatory rules may incur lower decisionmaking costs compared to the rule of unanimity, which renders
certain provisions almost impossible to amend when stocks are
dispersedly held by public investors.
3. Fiduciary Duty and the Duty of Fairness—Courts may also
impose mandatory rules on corporations by judicial review, on the
grounds of fiduciary duty and the duty of fairness. 100 Fiduciary
duty allows courts to interfere in the amendment of corporate
charters ex post without specifying which rules are mandatory. 101
For example, the Delaware court has developed a set of case laws
starting with Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. that impose
heightened standards of review on corporate decisions to adopt
takeover defenses. 102 When an amendment does not involve a
takeover defense, courts may still intervene on the ground of the
duty of fairness.103 Courts enjoy a certain advantage over legislators
because they do not need to lay out bright line rules about what
amendments are prohibited in advance and can intervene when
they detect opportunism in the amendment decisions.
The social costs that arise from judicial review can also be
analyzed using the framework of decision-making costs and
external costs. By delegating the tasks of curbing opportunistic
amendments to courts, shareholders may no longer need to require
a supermajority vote to approve the amendment of a corporate
charter, which significantly reduces the decision-making costs
100
See Branson, supra note 40, n. 3. See also Douglas M. Branson, Countertrends
in Corporation Law: Model Business Corporation Act Revision, British Company Law
Reform, and Principles of Corporate Governance and Structure, 68 MINN. L. REV. 53, 7072 (1983) (listing the effects of fiduciary duties on a corporation).
101
Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 956; Unitrin, Inc., 651 A.2d at 1361.
102
Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 956; Unitrin, Inc., 651 A.2d at 1361.
103
See Gordon, supra note 9, at 1588; E. R. Latty, Fairness. The Focal Point in
Preferred Stock Arrearage Elimination, 29 VA. L. REV. 2 (1942) (emphasizing fairness as
the focal point in any discussion over the legality of “arrange elimination”);
Kamena et al. v. Janssen Dairy Corporation, 133 N.J. Eq. 214, 31 A.2d 200, 217(1943)
(weighing whether a corporation’s proposed business plan “shocks the conscience”
of the court).
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because it alleviates the problem of holdout. A court can decide to
permit an amendment and rule against the attempts by certain
opportunistic shareholders to block the decision.
When
shareholders are too dispersed to assert their rights efficiently,
courts may consider their interests and reject the amendments that
are harmful to shareholders.104 However, judicial review may also
incur a certain level of decision-making costs—parties to a dispute
need to go through the litigation procedure, incurring
administrative and litigation costs.105 Moreover, the external costs
of this strategy depend on whether courts can successfully detect
opportunistic conduct.
4. Combination of Strategies—It should be noted that the above
analysis has not considered the possible combinations of different
strategies. A common combination of charter amendment rules is
to require the board of directors to initiate an amendment to a
corporate charter before shareholders can vote on the decision,
which creates a “bilateral veto”—an amendment that needs both the
approval of the board of directors and a majority vote of
shareholders. 106 This arrangement essentially imposes additional
restrictions on charter amendment compared to a rule that only
requires shareholder approval. It may increase the decision-making
costs compared to a simple majority rule of shares—even when
shareholders largely believe that an amendment is desirable, they
cannot initiate it without the support of the board. Meanwhile, it
may reduce external costs since it becomes more difficult for some
shareholders to amend the charter. 107 However, compared to a
supermajority rule, a “bilateral veto” may incur relatively lower
decision-making costs since the number of directors is usually small,
and they can act rather quickly with relatively low costs of decision
making. But, delegating the power to the board rather than using a
supermajority rule may incur the danger that some corporate
insiders control the board and make decisions for their private
benefits, incurring higher external costs compared to a
supermajority rule.
See Goshen & Squire, supra note 30.
See e.g. Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation,
7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 61 (1991) (discussing the costs involved in shareholder
litigation).
106
See Rock et al., supra note 12, at 186.
107
BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 233; COOTER, supra note 31, at 187.
104
105

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss2/4

2019]

Corporate Charter Amendment Rules

457

1.4. Economic Analysis of Charter Amendment Rules Across
Jurisdictions
As illustrated above, different charter amendment rules are
likely to incur different level of external costs and decision-making
costs. The magnitudes of external costs and decision-making costs
are likely affected by a set of factors that vary across jurisdictions.
In some jurisdictions, curbing external costs is a more important
goal for policymakers and public shareholders.108 In others, external
costs may be low, and decision-making costs become the major
concern. 109 Identifying these factors may further enable us to
explain charter amendment rules across jurisdictions.
1. Decision-Making Costs of Shareholder Voting—Let us first
consider the decision-making costs incurred in shareholder voting.
Decision-making costs include the direct costs that shareholders
must bear in participating in the collective decision and the costs
arising from the problem of holdout. Both of these costs are likely
to be affected by the ownership structure of corporations and the
presence or absence of institutional investors.
To illustrate, let us consider two hypothetical corporations. In
corporation A, a controlling shareholder holds about 21% of the
stocks, while a few institutional investors hold only 7% of the stocks,
and the rest are held by individuals who do not participate in
corporate governance. In corporation B, the institutional investors
hold blocks of shares and have certain incentives to participate in
corporate decision-making. The decision-making costs of a high
threshold for charter amendment, say, a three-fourths supermajority
vote of shareholders, is likely to be higher for corporation A than
corporation B. Suppose that corporation A needs to amend its
corporate charter to grant the board more authority in related party
transactions, assuming these transactions are beneficial for the
corporation.
Given the free-rider problem, corporation A’s
shareholders do not have sufficient incentive to participate in
corporate governance. In the shareholder meeting about the
amendment decision, only the controlling shareholder and the
institutional investors, holding in total 28% of the stocks of the
108
109

See infra Section 2.1 for a detailed discussion of various jurisdictions.
See infra Section 2.1 for a detailed discussion of various jurisdictions.
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corporation, are present. The institutional investors who hold 7% of
the stocks thus have de facto veto power over the amendment
decision. They can act opportunistically by threatening to block the
amendment unless the controlling shareholder agrees to give them
personal benefits. Since they only hold a small proportion of shares,
their incentive to approve the amendment is relatively small since
they obtain only 7% of the benefits, while they may gain much more
by holding up the decision. As a result, they may refuse to approve
a charter amendment even when the amendment is beneficial for all
shareholders.110 In corporation B, by contrast, institutional investors
may possess stronger incentives in studying or approving the
amendment.
Suppose institutional investors present in a
shareholder meeting hold up to 80% of the stocks of the corporation.
Assume that only institutional investors would participate in the
shareholder meeting. Any institutional investors hoping to hold out
the amendment decision would need to own at least 20% of the
shares (a quarter of 80% of the stocks). If the amendment is not
approved, the institutional investor is likely to suffer losses as well.
The presence of active institutional investors significantly reduces
decision-making costs because it alleviates both the direct costs and
the problem of holdout.
2. Decision-Making Costs of Mandatory Rules and Judicial Review—
The decision-making costs of mandatory rules also vary across
jurisdictions. 111 Mandatory rules are only unamendable to the
extent that legislators have not passed an amendment to the
corporate law in a particular state. If a state frequently amends its
mandatory rules, the decision-making costs may not be very high.
Moreover, in some states, corporations can choose between different
types of organizations, including for example, partnership, business
trust, limited liability company, and a general business corporation.
In these states, mandatory rules do not necessarily limit the

110
The institutional investor may overestimate the benefits for the controlling
shareholder and demand significant benefits from the controlling shareholder,
which the controlling shareholder may not be willing to provide. Consequently,
the amendment may not take place. See generally Goshen, supra note 7.
111
In some jurisdictions, the decision-making costs of amending the corporate
law are relatively high because corporate law is not considered as a priority in the
political agenda. See BRYAN R. CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW: THEORY, STRUCTURE, AND
OPERATION (1997) 233.
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autonomy of parties.112 An entrepreneur hoping to raise money by
issuing equity can thus signal her intention to credibly commit to a
set of rules that cannot be changed.113 Additionally, in a state with
a federal system, corporations can also pick the state of
incorporation, which allows them to select different sets of corporate
constitutions. Each state has its own corporate law that contains a
distinct level of mandatory rules. Entrepreneurs who hope to signal
that they want to commit to a set of rules that cannot be changed
afterwards can thus register in a state with tight mandatory rules.
By contrast, in other states where there is only one set of corporate
law, the decision-making costs of mandatory rules may be very
high.
Another important factor that affects the magnitude of decisionmaking costs of mandatory rules by legislators is legislative costs.
To amend a corporate statute, legislators would need to go through
complex
deliberation
procedures,
incurring
significant
administrative costs. Spending resources on amending a corporate
statute also means that less attention would be devoted to other
pressing issues. A crude proxy for measuring the legislative costs of
amending a corporate statute is the frequency of the amendment of
the statute. In the U.K., for example, scholars argue that company
law is usually not given a high priority since it is apolitical.114 As a
result, company law is not frequently amended. 115 In China, a
developing country, the Company Act was first enacted in 1993 and
has only been amended twice so far, in 2005 and 2014, while the
landscape of corporations in China has been changing drastically.
The delay in amending the corporate law may negatively affect the
adaptability of corporate charters if many provisions are mandatory.
The decision-making costs of judicial review depend on the
efficiency of the legal system. In some states, resorting to litigation
112
Romano, supra note 18, at 1600 (“Moreover, if a state has a particular
payout restriction, such as a capital surplus requirement, which prevents a firm
from paying out a dividend, it can reincorporate in a state that does not have the
same rule”).
113
Armour et al., What is Corporate Law, in REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 22 (2nd
ed., 2009).
114
See BRYAN R. CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW: THEORY, STRUCTURE, AND
OPERATION (1997) 233 (explaining the U.K. Parliament’s limited ability to pass
legislation and how that causes it to deprioritize matters that are not of immediate
concern).
115 Id.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

460

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 41:2

may be exceptionally costly for shareholders. Moreover, in states
where class action is not allowed, each shareholder would tend to
“free ride” on the efforts of others and would not initiate lawsuits
against corporations even when the amendment of corporate
charters harms their interests.
3. External Costs of Shareholder Voting—The magnitude of
external costs incurred in shareholder voting also depends on
several factors and varies across jurisdictions. Perhaps one of the
most important factors is the ownership structure of the corporation.
In a corporation, shareholders holding more shares are entitled to
more voting rights, while each citizen in a state has only one vote.
This is an important concern in considering the relationship between
external costs and decision-making costs. If a corporation is held by
a controlling shareholder who holds more than 50% of shares, a
simple majority vote is likely to incur high external costs, compared
to a corporation in which shares are dispersedly held. Majority
shareholders can always amend the corporate charter in any way to
further their own interests.
Under such circumstances, a
supermajority vote, or a majority of the minority vote, may
significantly reduce external costs. Similarly, in a corporation with
a controlling shareholder holding 90% of the shares, a three-fourths
supermajority vote may not be able to significantly reduce external
costs since it does not prevent opportunistic amendments initiated
by the controlling shareholder.
The magnitude of external costs also depends on the
idiosyncratic value each shareholder subjectively attaches to the
rights conferred by a certain provision.116 If shareholders all have
similar goals, the consent of some members can serve as evidence
that the rest of the shareholders would also agree if they were not
trying to hold out the decision to obtain more personal benefits.
Allowing the majority’s consent to also bind the minority would
impose lower external costs, as Figure 2 shows.

116
BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 115 (“It seems reasonable to expect
that more will be invested in bargaining in a group composed of members who
have distinctly different external characteristics than in a group composed of
roughly homogeneous members.”).
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Figure 2: External Costs and Size of the Vote Required (Low
Idiosyncratic Value)

Social Costs

External costs

Delegation to the board
of directors/ majority
vote without a quorum
requirement/ Dual Class
Shareholding

Majority vote
by
Shareholders

Supermajority Unanimous
vote
vote

Size of the vote
required to take
certain action

By contrast, if the amendment of certain provisions affects
shareholders’ interests in different ways, a majority or a
supermajority vote becomes questionable. Figure 3 presents the
curve of external costs, which remain largely steady as the size of
the vote required to amend the charter increases and only drops
steeply down to zero when a unanimity rule is reached. For
example, in a merger transaction, some shareholders may have
“inframarginal” value—they believe that the shares they own are
worth more than the market price. Thus, shareholders may disagree
as to whether the consideration in a merger transaction is adequate.
Allowing shareholders with a majority of the voting shares to make
the decision on behalf of all shareholders would mean that the
shareholders who believe the stocks to be most valuable are coerced
into selling their stocks. One may argue that the inframarginal value
always exists because if shareholders did not believe the value of the
stocks to be above the market price, they would have sold them
already rather than holding on to them. In these cases, a
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supermajority rule with a high threshold may not significantly
reduce external costs unless it reaches close to unanimity.
The factor of idiosyncratic value explains why corporate law
generally imposes more constraints on classified shares and
shareholders with different rights. In many jurisdictions, the
amendment of corporate charters that affect the interests of one
particular class of shares needs the approval of shareholders of that
class.117 Meanwhile, the creation of unequal shareholder rights is
sometimes prohibited by the “one share, one vote” principle in some
jurisdictions.118 Even in jurisdictions where it is allowed, corporate
law may require a higher threshold of shareholder voting.119 When
shareholders are treated differently, their interests may significantly
diverge. A majority or a supermajority vote by all shareholders may
not adequately protect the interests of the dissenting shareholders.

117
See, e.g., Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 633 (U.K.) (providing that when an
amendment varies the rights attached to a class of shares, a group of at least 15% of
the holders of that class “may apply to the court to have the variation cancelled”);
Aktiengesetz[AktG] [Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBL I at 1089, last
amended by Art. 5 Amendment Act, May 10, 2016, BGBL I at 1142 (Ger.),
[https://perma.cc/6X2K-C9JF] [hereinafter Stock Corporation Act (Ger.)] (“[A]
resolution of the shareholders’ meeting shall require a majority of not less than
three fourths of the share capital represented at the passing of the resolution.”);
Kaisha-hō [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 322 (providing that acts that
are likely to adversely affect the class shareholders of any class of shares “shall not
become effective unless a resolution is made at a Class Meeting constituted by the
Class Shareholders of the shares of such class”).
118
See Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One
Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 687, 688 (1985)
(discussing the NYSE’s longstanding “one common share, one vote rule” and its
history in the United States).
119
For example, under Article 109(2) of the 2005 Companies Act of Japan, a
non-public company can stipulate in its charter that shareholders be treated
differently. Kaisha-hō [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 109(2). However,
pursuant to Article 309(4),
resolutions of the shareholders meetings which effect any amendment in
the articles of incorporation . . . with respect to the amendment in the
articles of incorporation pursuant to the provisions of Article 109(2) shall
be made by the majority . . . of all shareholders, being a majority equating
three quarters (in cases where a higher proportion is provided for in the
articles of incorporation, such proportion) or more of the votes of all
shareholders.
Id. at 309(4).
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Figure 3: External Costs and Size of the Vote Required (High
Idiosyncratic Value)
Social Costs
External costs

Delegation to the board
of directors/ majority
vote without a quorum
requirement/ Dual Class
Shareholding

Majority vote
by
shareholders

Supermajority
vote

Unanimous
vote

Size of the vote
required to take
certain action

4. External Costs of Mandatory Rules and Judicial Review—The
magnitude of external costs incurred in using mandatory rules to
curb the opportunistic amendment problem is affected by the
political economy of the legislative process of corporate law in
different states. For example, a statutory amendment may benefit
managers rather than shareholders since dispersed shareholders
suffer from the free-rider problem while managers can organize
themselves to push for certain amendments to corporate statutes in
the state. 120 Under these circumstances, delegating the task to state
legislators to devise mandatory rules may still incur relatively high
external costs. Similarly, although courts, securities regulators, and
stock exchanges usually incur relatively low external costs because
they are a relatively disinterested party, it is also possible that judges
and regulators may be captured by corporate insiders who are
economically and politically powerful, which may translate into
high external costs.121

Black, supra note 18, at 568.
See, e.g., G. William Schwert, Public Regulation of National Securities
Exchanges: A Test of the Capture Hypothesis, 8 BELL J. ECON. 128 (1977).
120
121
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The external costs incurred by delegating the decision to courts
in the form of judicial review depend on the expertise of the court.
In developed countries, courts are generally more sophisticated in
making decisions on corporate law issues, but often the legal
institutions are less developed in developing countries.
Shareholders may also delegate the amendment decision to
securities regulators and stock exchanges, which may help curb the
opportunistic amendment of corporate charters. 122 Regulation by
stock exchanges may impose certain pressure on listed corporations,
deterring them from acting opportunistically against the interests of
public shareholders. 123 Stock exchanges usually can react much
faster than legislators and courts to respond to new problems. In
developing countries where the judicial system is underdeveloped,
stock exchanges may possess more expertise and thus play a larger
role than courts and legislators.
2.

EXPLAINING CHARTER AMENDMENT RULES

The above theoretical framework can be employed to explain
several puzzles in the corporate law literature, including the
variation of charter amendment rules in corporate law across
jurisdiction, the mandatory rules that exist in corporate law, and the
procedural burdens that are usually associated with the exercise of
appraisal rights.
2.1. The Variation of Charter Amendment Rules Across Jurisdictions
1. The United States Approach — In the United States, Delaware is
the most important state for the study of corporate law. The
Delaware Corporate Code provides that the amendment of
corporate charters must be initiated by the board of directors and
approved by a “vote of the majority of shares present in person or
122

(1997).

See generally Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453

123
See generally Benjamin L. Liebman & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Reputational
Sanctions in China’s Securities Market, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 929 (2008) (examining the
distinct paths that stock market develops by tracing China’s regulations of the stock
market).
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represented by proxy at the meeting and entitled to vote on the
subject matter.”124 For some decisions, such as a merger or a sale of
assets, Delaware law requires a majority of the outstanding
shares.125 A quorum consisting of no less than one third of the shares
is required, although the certificate of incorporation or bylaws of the
corporation can specify a higher quorum requirement.126 Without
the initiation of the board of directors, shareholders cannot approve
any change to the corporate charter.127 Other significant corporate
changes such as merger and issuance of new shares also need to be
initiated by the board of directors.128 This “bilateral veto” regime is
a unique characteristic of the law in Delaware, while board approval
is not necessary in amending the charter in the U.K., Germany, and
France.129
The above theoretical framework can explain the Delaware
model. Let us first compare the Delaware bilateral veto model with
a simple majority rule. The bilateral veto regime requires two levels
of approval similar to the “bicameral legislature” design in the
United States. This bilateral veto model incurs additional decisionmaking costs when compared to a simple majority rule that requires
only a majority vote of shares by shareholders.130 On the other hand,
the bilateral veto regime may reduce external costs compared to a
majority rule, since shareholders controlling above 51% of shares
cannot initiate an amendment to the corporate charter without the
boards’ approval. This bilateral veto may be effective in protecting
the minority shareholders against a hostile takeover.

124
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(2) (2019). Although corporations are free to
choose a supermajority vote, it is not mandatory. See id. § 242(b). In an antitakeover context, a supermajority vote is sometimes employed as a “shark
repellent;” a corporation may raise the size of the vote required to approve a merger
in its charter, which cannot be amended unless by a supermajority vote. In this
way, shareholders ensure that the provision is locked-in and cannot be amended
easily by a hostile acquirer. See Gilson, The Case Against Shark Repellent Amendments:
Structural Limitations on the Enabling Concept, supra note 74, at 790 (discussing how
“lock-up amendments” can be used to deter unwanted takeovers).
125
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c), 271(a), 275(b).
126
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216.
127
In Europe, the charter usually can be amended without initiation by the
board. See Rock et al., supra note 12, at 186.
128
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242.
129
See Rock et al., supra note 12, at 186.
130
See BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 233 (discussing the institution
of the bicameral legislature in constitutional systems).
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However, if the bilateral veto regime is compared, instead, to a
supermajority rule that requires a three-fourths vote of shares, the
bilateral veto regime may incur lower decision-making costs than
the three-fourths system since directors in the bilateral veto regime
could usually act with lower reliance on shareholders. That said, the
bilateral veto regime would likely incur higher external costs than
the supermajority rule since directors under the bilateral veto
regime are selected only by a majority vote of shares. Thus, in
bilateral veto regime, shareholders holding a majority of shares
could have greater control of the board and may still harm the
interests of the rest of the shareholders.
While some scholars worry about management entrenchment
under the bilateral veto approach,131 this Article suggests that the
bilateral veto arrangement and the simple majority rule need to be
considered together. The combination of these two strategies
achieve a unique balance between decision-making costs and
external costs. If Delaware did not require board initiation and,
instead, adopted a simple majority rule, such a choice may raise
external costs since some shareholders could more easily amend the
corporate charter in their favor at the expense of all shareholders.
This combined approach may also reduce decision-making costs
and allow charters to adapt to new circumstances more easily.
The above theory can also explain the difference between charter
amendment rules in Delaware and the supermajority rule adopted
by many European countries. Although the bilateral veto regime
adopted by Delaware incurs relatively high external costs compared
with the supermajority rule, there exist alternative mechanisms to
protect the interest of minority shareholders, thus alleviating the
concern for external costs. One important mechanism is judicial
review—courts impose a fiduciary duty on directors to ensure that
these transactions will not harm the interests of shareholders. 132
Courts in Delaware are renowned for their expertise in corporate
law and actively engage in resolving corporate charter amendment
disputes.
An example may help illustrate the role of courts in charter
amendment. Consider a corporation that decides to issue senior
securities or eliminate existing rights by a board decision approved

131
132

See generally Bebchuk, supra note 29.
See Rock et al., supra note 12, at 220.
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by a majority vote cast by shareholders. 133 The Delaware courts
frequently review such decision to see whether it meets the fiduciary
duty. In an early case in 1936, Keller v. Wilson & Co., shareholders
with majority voting rights in a corporation decided to cancel the
dividends accrued on its preferred stock. 134 The Delaware court
invalidated the action on the ground that it violated the vested
property rights of the holders of the corporation’s preferred stock.135
Although the vested property right doctrine was later discarded,136
the Delaware court would still intervene to protect shareholders
against unfair or inequitable treatment.137 The Delaware law relied
significantly on ex post legal intervention by courts rather than
relying on ex ante legislation or shareholder voting to approve
charter amendments. Courts also engage in decisions that involve
the amendment of bylaws. In another Delaware case, Blasius
Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp.,138 a hostile acquirer, Blasius, proposed
to the board of directors of Atlas to enlarge the board from eight to
fifteen and to appoint another eight directors in order to seize
control of Atlas. The board thwarted this attempt by amending the
bylaws to add two more directors to the board, preventing Blasius
from seizing control even if the shareholder’s proposal were
approved. 139 The court ruled that directors cannot interfere with
shareholders’ rights to vote unless there is a “compelling

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1).
See Keller v. Wilson & Co., 190 A. 115 (Del. 1936).
135
Id. at 125-26 (“It is one thing to confer a general power to accomplish a
purpose in the future. It is quite another thing to say that the power may be
exercised to destroy a right accrued and recognized as a vested right of property.”).
136
See Branson, supra note 40, n. 81; see, e.g., Bove v. Community Hotel Corp.,
105 R.I. 36, 44 (1969) (“Delaware [has] discarded ‘vested rights’ as the test for
determining the power of a corporation to eliminate a shareholder's right to
preferred stock dividend accumulation[ . . . .]”).
137
See Latty, supra note 103, at 1 (arguing that fairness should be the focal
point in discussing the legality of particular corporate decisions); Kamena et al. v.
Janssen Dairy Corporation, 133 N.J. Eq. at 217-18:
133
134

If such a plan is inequitable to the extent that it shocks the conscience of
the court, this court then has the right as well as the duty to enjoin its
consummation. It is more a question of fair dealing between the strong
and the weak than it is a question of percentages or proportions of the
votes favoring the plan.
See Blasius Indus. Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del.Ch. 1988).
Id. at 655. Delaware law allows shareholders to delegate the amendment
of the bylaws to the board of directors. See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109.
138
139
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justification.”140 This case demonstrates that although Delaware law
allows corporations to delegate authority to the board to amend the
bylaws, the court can intervene to ensure that such power is not
abused.141
The efficient legal system in Delaware also prevents holdout
from happening even though corporate insiders can easily amend
the articles of incorporation and the bylaws. 142 If the courts are
capable of detecting holdout, the threshold of shareholder voting to
approve an amendment decision can be lowered to reduce decisionmaking costs without the danger of raising external costs to a high
level. 143 These factors might explain why legislators designed a
lenient rule in Delaware after weighing the consent of shareholders.
The above theoretical framework of external costs and decisionmaking costs also explains the seemingly “inconsistent”
arrangement whereby shareholders are allowed to initiate changes
to the bylaws, which contain “second-order rules,” while they
cannot initiate changes to the charter provisions, which are the
“first-order rules”—an arrangement Bebchuk refers to as a puzzle.144
The theory proposed in this Article suggests that board initiation
should be viewed as an additional barrier to the opportunistic
amendment of corporate charter rather than a limitation on
shareholders’ rights. Thus, the current law is reasonable since the
amendment to the corporate charter requires two steps—board
approval and shareholder approval, while amendment to the
bylaws requires the approval of only one of the corporate organs.
To sum up, for the state of Delaware, using a bilateral veto rule
may significantly lower decision-making costs compared to the
See Blasius Indus. Inc., 564 A.2d at 661.
Scholars have noted that corporate rules in Delaware are “probably the
least regulatory of states.” Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 1482.
142
In Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971), the
bylaws allowed directors to move the date of the shareholder meeting. Directors of
the corporation moved the date of the shareholder meeting in order to make it more
difficult for shareholders to attend and to replace directors. The court banned such
a move on the ground that it violated the shareholders’ franchise.
143
Professor John Coffee Jr., in considering the tradeoff between ex ante bright
line prohibitions and ex post judicial review, argues that courts in the United States
tolerate contractual freedom because of their ability to detect opportunistic actions.
I believe, however, the tradeoff between the second-party and the third-party
approach deserves more attention. Coffee, Jr., supra note 34, at 1620. The U.K.
courts may not be as sophisticated as the Delaware courts. CHEFFINS, supra note
111, at 309.
144
See Bebchuk, supra note 29, at 846.
140
141
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supermajority rule. Additionally, the bilateral veto rule may not
increase external costs compared to a supermajority rule as initially
considered, since alternative mechanisms such as fiduciary duty
enforced by courts offer additional protection for shareholders.
Therefore, the bilateral veto rule may be efficient in the state of
Delaware compared to a supermajority rule. While some scholars
in the United States argue that a board-centered corporate
governance structure incurs agency costs and have called for
empowering shareholders, 145 a supermajority rule may incur
significant decision-making costs significant enough to render it an
inefficient or less efficient approach.146
2. The U.K. Approach—By comparison, under the Companies Act
of the U.K., a resolution to amend the corporate charter needs to be
passed by a three-fourths majority. 147 If a corporation seeks a
variation of the rights of a class of shares, the shareholders must vote
as a separate class. The U.K. law has also set forth a quorum
requirement for such decisions. 148 Section 334(4) provides that
under these circumstances, “two persons present holding at least
one-third in nominal value of the issued shares of the class in
question (excluding any shares of that class held as treasury shares)”
need to be present in most meetings.149 These rules suggest that the
U.K. law has set a higher threshold for the amendment of corporate
charters. Apart from the amendment of charter provisions, the U.K.
law also sets a 75% threshold for mergers, which is higher than
Delaware requires. Corporations listed on the market in London
also need to gain shareholder approval for transactions of corporate

145
See generally id. (arguing that, by allowing shareholders to adopt charter
amendments, corporate governance would improve).
146 See Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, supra note
30, at 1755 (expressing skepticism toward Bebchuk’s argument that increasing
shareholder power will improve corporate governance).
147
U.K. companies can pass a written resolution by a majority of not less than
75% of the total voting rights of eligible members. They can also pass a resolution
on a show of hands by not less than 75% of the persons who actually vote at the
meeting. They can also pass a resolution on a poll taken at a meeting “by members
representing not less than 75% of the total voting rights of the members who (being
entitled to do so) vote in person, by proxy, or in advance on the resolution.”
Companies Act 2006, c. 46, supra note 1, § 283 (Eng.).
148
Id. § 630(4).
149
Id. § 334(4).
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assets reaching a certain size. 150 Existing shareholders also enjoy
preemptive rights and can purchase new shares pro rata before
shares are issued to outsiders.151
The U.K. model can be termed a “shareholder-centered model”
since the amendment of corporate charters significantly relies on
shareholder approval. Two factors may explain the U.K.’s high
threshold for amendments to corporate charters First, courts in the
U.K. are less sophisticated than their counterparts in Delaware and
lack the expertise in dealing with corporate law issues. 152 As a
result, external costs in the U.K. may be higher since courts may not
be able to detect wrongdoing by corporate insiders or controlling
shareholders.
Second, institutional investors in the U.K. are active participants
in corporate governance.153 Studies have shown that institutional
investors in the U.K. hold a higher percentage of shares than their
counterparts in the United States. 154 This makes it easier for the
150 Financial
Conduct Authority, 43 Listing Rules 10.1.3 (2019),
[https://perma.cc/3WP8-XWEU]. See also Rock et al., supra note 12, at 221.
151
Companies Act 2006, c. 46, supra note 1, § 560-77 (Eng.),
[https://perma.cc/B9WD-KJ7J]. By contrast, in the United States, the default rule
is that shareholders do not have preemptive rights. Scholars have noted that the
preemptive rights may delay the issuance of new shares and raise decision-making
costs. See Rock et al., supra note 12, at 196.
152
See Zohar Goshen, The Efficiency of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory
Meets Reality, 91 CAL. L. REV. 393, 431 (2003) (“The vast majority of judges [in the
U.K.] lack any expertise with the realities of the corporate world.”).
153
See Paul L. Davies & Klaus J. Hopt, Corporate Boards in Europe—
Accountability and Convergence, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 301, 366-67 (2013) (analyzing the
active function of corporate boards in several European Countries); Bernard S.
Black & John C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior Under
Limited Regulation, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1997, 2002 (1994) (explaining the role of financial
institutions in corporate governance in the U.K.). In recent years, however, the
equity shares held by institutional investors in the U.K. have gradually declined,
replaced by more foreign institutional investors. A survey in 2008 showed that
most publicly traded stocks in the U.K. were held by foreign investors (42%). Brian
R. Cheffins, The Stewardship Code’s Achilles’ Heel, 73 MOD. L. REV. 1004, 1018 (2010)
(highlighting that many of the foreign investors are still institutional investors).
Domestic institutional investors held about 30%,while individuals held about 10%.
Id. See also BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: BRITISH
BUSINESS TRANSFORMED 390 (2008) (breaking down the change in owner ship, from
1993 to 2006, of shares in publicly traded U.K. companies).
154
See, e.g., John Armour, Brian R. Cheffins & David A. Skeel Jr, Corporate
Ownership Structure and the Evolution of Bankruptcy Law: Lessons from the United
Kingdom, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1699, 1750 (2002) (“In the United States, institutional
shareholders own approximately 50% of the shares of the country’s publicly quoted
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largest institutional investors to exercise control. 155 Shareholders
thus can participate in corporate decisions with low decisionmaking costs. Consequently, it is external costs, not decisionmaking costs, that are the main worry for corporate shareholders in
the U.K., which makes a higher threshold for charter amendment
more appropriate.
3. The Middle Road: France and Germany—French law and German
law have taken an approach somewhere in between the approaches
of Delaware and the U.K. Under French corporate law, an
amendment of the articles of association needs to be approved by a
two-thirds majority vote present or represented. 156 A merger
transaction also requires a two-thirds majority vote.157 Shareholders
holding or representing one quarter of the voting shares need to be
present at an extraordinary general meeting to meet the quorum
requirement. 158 If the quorum requirement is not met, a second
meeting could be convened where there is no quorum
requirement.159 This enables corporations to move forward without
the approval of a supermajority vote by all shareholders.
While current studies have already recognized the importance
of an active judicial system in determining the scope of mandatory
rules in corporate law,160 judicial capacity is apparently not the sole
factor since it cannot fully explain the differences in corporate law
across jurisdictions. One may compare French law with U.K. law
and conclude that French law sets a lower threshold for charter
amendment—a two-thirds majority vote of shares and no quorum
companies, with the remainder held directly by individual investors. In the U.K.,
in contrast, the equivalent figure is more than 70%.”).
155 Id. at 1751 (“In Britain, it is common for a company’s twenty-five largest
institutional investors to own a majority of the shares. In the U.S. the same number
of institutions will typically only own about one-third of the equity in a
corporation.”).
156
CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] [COMMERCIAL CODE] art. L. 225-96 (Fr.)
(Translated to English), [https://perma.cc/V6P4-6CS9].
157
Id. arts. L. 236-2 and L. 225-96. This is also the minimum requirement for
public companies in Europe. Council Directive 78/855, art. 7, 1978 O.J. (L 295) 38.
158
CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] [COMMERCIAL CODE], supra note 156, art.
L225-98 (An ordinary general meeting can make decisions “only if the shareholders
present or represented hold at least one fifth of the voting shares” when it is first
convened.).
159
Id. art. L. 225-96.
160
See generally Coffee, Jr., supra note 32, at 1293 (describing the courts’ lack of
involvement in repurchasing rules and corporate liability).
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requirement, whereas in the U.K., a three-fourths majority is
necessary. This does not suggest, however, that the French court is
more capable of detecting opportunist actions by corporate insiders.
This Article provides an explanation more aligned with the
reality: the decision-making costs in France may be higher compared
to the U.K. In the U.K., corporations are held mainly by institutional
investors who have a strong presence in corporate governance.161
By contrast, corporations in France usually have concentrated
ownership, while institutional investors traditionally play only a
small role compared to those in the U.K. and the state of Delaware.162
For a long time, households in France owned a significant
proportion of shares of listed corporations.163 Thus, a three-fourths
supermajority vote may incur relatively high decision-making costs
in France. Additionally, since many French companies have a
controlling shareholder holding a majority of shares, a simple
majority rule is likely to incur high external costs. Examining both
external and decision-making costs enables a clearer understanding
of rules governing corporate charter amendments in France.
161
CHEFFINS, supra note 111, at 64 (1997); Black & Coffee, Jr., supra note 153, at
2002 (“U.K. institutions hold about two-thirds of all publicly traded British stocks,
while U.S. institutions only hold around half of U.S. publicly traded stock.”).
162
See Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], Corporate Governance: A
Survey of OECD Countries, at 33 (2004),
https://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/21755678.
pdf. [https://perma.cc/5UYT-R9HC]; Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev.
[OECD], OECD Economic Surveys: France, at 118 (1997), https://www.oecdilibrary.org/economics/oecd-economic-surveys-france-1997_eco_surveys-fra1997-en [https://perma.cc/GLJ6-A4GJ]. See also Antoin Murphy, Corporate
Ownership in France: The Importance of History, in A HISTORY OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD: FAMILY BUSINESS GROUPS TO PROFESSIONAL
MANAGERS 185, 188 (2005) (listing concentration of ownership and extensive
family ownership as two of the most salient features of France’s current corporate
ownership structure). Statistics show that above 24% of the largest 416 French
firms have a controlling shareholder. James A. Fanto, The Role of Corporate Law in
French Corporate Governance, 31 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 31, 42 (1998). The average level
of shareholder attendance is only about 30% of the corporate capital. Yvew
Guyon, France, in SHAREHOLDER VOTING RIGHTS AND PRACTICES IN EUROPE AND THE
UNITED STATES 95, 102 (Baums Theodor & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 1999). Statistics
show that in the largest 155 French companies, only 48 of them have institutional
investors. Julian Franks & Colin Mayer, Corporate Ownership and Control in the
U.K., Germany, and France, 9 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 30, 36 (1997). Some other studies
suggest that the proportion of shares held by individuals is lower. Gérard
Charreaux & Peter Wirtz, Corporate Governance in France, 1-11 (2007). However,
this is likely because many individuals hold equity interests by owning nonfinancial corporations.
163
See Fanto, supra note 162, at 43.
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Consider for example two hypothetical corporations, one in
France and one in the U.K. The French corporation has a controlling
shareholder holding 30% of the shares and several institutional
investors holding 10% of the shares in total, while the rest are held
by individual shareholders who do not have incentives to
participate in corporate decisions. Setting the threshold for charter
amendment at three-fourths majority may allow the institutional
investors in the French corporation to effectively block the
amendment. However, since these shareholders hold only 10% of
the shares of the corporation, their decision does not necessarily
reflect the interests of all the shareholders.164 They may hold out the
decision for their personal benefits. Therefore, lowering the
threshold to two-thirds may significantly reduce decision-making
costs. In the U.K. corporation, by contrast, institutional investors
who have both the incentives and the expertise for participating in
a charter amendment decision hold a majority of the stocks, while
individual shareholders hold only about 10%. A three-fourths
majority is not likely to give rise to high decision-making costs since
shareholders attending a meeting are likely to hold a high
proportion of the shares of the corporation, making it difficult for
any particular shareholder to hold out the decision without holding
a significant block of shares in the corporation. 165 Thus, a threefourths majority rule may incur high decision-making costs in
France but not in the U.K.
Germany takes a different, but similarly balanced approach.
While the articles of association can be amended by a majority vote
below the three-fourths level, amendment of important provisions,
including, for example, the purpose of the corporation, must have a
three-fourths vote.166 The issuance of a new class of preferred stocks
and merger transactions also need a three-fourths majority vote.167
When a decision of the corporation negatively affects the interests of
a class of shares, it needs to be approved by a three-fourths majority
See generally Goshen, supra note 7.
See Franks & Mayer, supra note 162.
166 See Stock Corporation Act (Ger.), supra note 117, at 1142, § 179. See also id.
§§ 182(2), 186(1), 193, 202(2), 222. For relatively trivial matters, a simple majority
would suffice. See, e.g., id. § 113(1); Ernest C. Steefelt & Bernhard von Falkenhausen,
New German Stock Corporation Law, 4 CORNELL L. REV. 518, 541 (1967) (explaining
that although most resolutions pass by a simple majority, anything above normal
importance requires a three-fourths majority).
167
See Rock et al., supra note 12, at 197.
164
165
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vote of the shareholders adversely affected. 168 Additionally,
German law does not allow shareholders to delegate the power to
the board of directors to approve the amendment of corporate
charters, except in several limited circumstances, including, for
example, “the authority to make amendments that relate solely to
the wording of the articles.”169
The factor of institutional investors may also explain the
shareholder voting rules under German law. Amending corporate
charters in Germany is still relatively easier than in the U.K., where
any amendment needs a three-fourths majority. This can again be
explained by the fact that institutional investors, such as banks,
trusts, and insurance companies, play a smaller role in Germany
than in the U.K.170 Institutional investors have both the expertise
and the incentives to participate in corporate governance.
Corporations with many institutional investors thus may incur
lower decision-making costs in using a supermajority rule
compared with a corporation with many retail investors. The
dominant corporate financial structure in Germany can also explain
why German law did not choose a simple majority rule. In
Germany, most listed corporations are held by a controlling
shareholder.171 A simple majority rule would incur high external
costs since the majority shareholder would dominate the
amendment of the corporate charter.172
See Stock Corporation Act (Ger.), supra note 117, at 1142, § 179.
Id. §§ 119, 179(1). Shareholders may also “authorize [sic] the management
board [ . . .] to increase the share capital up to a specified par value (authorised [sic]
capital) by issuing new shares against contributions,” or to cancel shares by means
of mandatory redemption. Id. §§ 202(1), 237(6). Moreover, shareholders can act
without actions from the board. Rock et al., supra note 12 at 186.
170 Id. See also Franks & Mayer supra note 162, at 33-37 (providing comparative
statistics of the proportions of shares owned by different groups within France,
Germany, and the U.K.); Thomas Kirchmaier & Jeremy Grant, Corporate Ownership
Structure and Performance in Europe, 2 EUR. MGMT. REV. 231, 237 (2005) (comparing
the ownership of institutional shareholders to those of other owners in France,
Germany, Italy, Spain and the U.K.).
171
Theodor Baums, Germany, in SHAREHOLDER VOTING RIGHTS AND PRACTICES
IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 113 (Theodor Baums & Eddy Wymeersch eds.,
1999); Gur Aminadav & Elias Papaioannou, Corporate Control Around the World,
Working Paper 23010 http://www.nber.org/papers/w23010, at 49 (2016).
172
The above analysis also explains the difference between German law and
French law. Although corporations in both Germany and France have concentrated
ownership, studies suggest that banks play a relatively larger role in Germany since
they hold a larger proportion of shares in corporations. Franks & Mayer, supra note
168
169
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2.2. Mandatory Rules in Corporate Law
The above theory can also explain mandatory rules in corporate
law, since mandatory rules can also be viewed as charter
amendment rules that bar shareholders from amending certain
provisions in the corporate charters. Mandatory rules in corporate
law have long been an interesting subject for corporate law
scholars.173 In the academic literature, a corporation is often referred
to as a “nexus of contracts.” 174 The contractarian view, most
famously supported by Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, posits
that corporate law mainly contains enabling rules as default
contractual terms, which reduce the transaction costs between
different parties in a corporation, including shareholders and
managers.175 Easterbrook and Fischel argue that corporate law is
what the parties would have agreed upon had the transaction costs
been lower. Since the transaction costs of enacting the corporate
contract are often too high, corporate law provides the fiduciary
duty enforced by courts, which allows courts to “fill the gap” in the
corporate contract.176 If corporations are like contracts, parties to a
corporation should thus be allowed to write their own contract to
further their interest. It thus remains an interesting question what
justifies mandatory rules in corporate law.
Jeffrey Gordon has famously proposed an opportunistic
amendment hypothesis, which is the dominant theory that explains
mandatory rules.177 Corporations may opportunistically amend the
charter after shareholders invest in the corporation.178 The decision
162, at 32-35. This is consistent with the fact that German law has provided a higher
threshold for charter amendment compared to French law.
173
See Gordon, supra note 9; Romano, supra note 18; Black, supra note 18;
Bebchuk, supra note 18; Eisenberg, supra note 18.
174
See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of The Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310
(1976) (describing organizations as legal fictions that “serve as a nexus for a set of
contracting relationships”).
175
See Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, supra note 33, at
737; Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, supra note 33, at 427.
176 See Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, supra note 33, at 427.
177
See Gordon, supra note 9, at 1591. Romano, supra note 18 Black, supra note
18.
178
One example is the charter amendment rules themselves. While charter
amendment rules in corporate laws across the globe usually provide that
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to amend the corporate charter may not reflect the true consent of
shareholders. 179 Such midstream changes would allow corporate
insiders to enhance their power and even to entrench themselves.180
Thus, even scholars who fully embrace the contractarian view
should be suspicious when a corporation amends its charter because
true consent is difficult to obtain given the holdout problem.181
Scholars have pointed out that the opportunistic amendment
hypothesis has serious drawbacks. For example, Romano argues
that corporations are allowed to adopt takeover defenses which may
harm the interests of shareholders and benefit corporate insiders.182
The opportunistic amendment hypothesis does not fully explain this
shareholders can amend the corporate charters with a supermajority or a majority
vote of shares, these charter amendment rules themselves are not subject to the
same rule. For example, in the state of Delaware, the mandatory charter
amendment rules include the following: (1) while shareholders are generally free
to delegate the power to amend the bylaws to the board of directors, they cannot
delegate the power to amend the certificate of incorporation to the board; (2)
shareholders must vote on certain mergers. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 109, 242,
251(c). Corporate laws in other states of the United States are similar to the state of
Delaware in granting strong power to the board of directors. Bebchuk, supra note
29, at 844. These rules can be termed “non-delegation” rules in corporate law,
similar to the non-delegation doctrine in administrative law. Moreover, listed
corporations in the United States also cannot amend their charters to establish a
dual class share structure, which allow some shareholders to decide the
amendment of the corporate charter. Voting Rights Listing Standards, 53 Fed. Reg.
26,376 (July 12, 1988). See also Rock et al., supra note 12, at 192. These rules bar
shareholders from delegating the amending power to the board of directors or a
class of shareholders who are usually insiders of the corporation. Similarly, the
2006 Companies Act in the U.K. mandates that any amendment to the articles of
association needs a supermajority vote of shares, thus preventing shareholders
from delegating the power of amending the articles to shareholders holding only a
majority of shares. Additionally, German law also does not allow shareholders to
delegate the power to the board of directors to approve the amendment of corporate
charters, except in several limited circumstances, for example in making
“amendments that relate solely to the wording of the articles.” Stock Corporation
Act (Ger.), supra note 117, §§ 119, 179(1). Shareholders may also “authorise [sic] the
management board [ . . .] to increase the share capital up to a specified par value
(authorised [sic] capital) by issuing new shares against contributions,” or to cancel
shares by means of mandatory redemption. Id. §§ 202(1), 237(6).
179
Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., 90 A.2d 660, 665 (Del. 1952) (noting
where a board of directors of the defendant corporation adopted a restricted stock
plan to come from authorized but not yet issued and reacquired shares. Plaintiff
challenged because of her pre-emptive rights which was dismissed by the chancery
court. The Supreme Court of Delaware re-manded for trial). Branson, supra note
40, at 392. Rock et al., supra note 12, at 24.
180 See Gordon, supra note 9, at 1573.
181
See Bebchuk, supra note 25, at 1820-1860.
182
See Romano, supra note 18, at 1606.
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phenomenon. Moreover, the opportunistic amendment problem
could, in theory, be addressed by raising the threshold for
amendment to a supermajority rule or a unanimity rule.183 If, as
scholars argue, that opportunistic amendment is the only problem,
shareholders can simply agree to certain “entrenched provisions” in
the initial charter that certain rules can never be amended, thus
barring all midstream changes from occurring. 184 In fact, the
Companies Act of the U.K. provides a special type of provision in
the articles of association called “entrenched provisions.”185 These
provisions may be made either upon formation of the corporation
or “by an amendment of the company’s articles agreed to by all the
members of the company,” (i.e. by unanimous consent of all
shareholders). Specifically, shareholders can agree in the initial
corporate charter that the charter amendment rule cannot be
amended in the midstream without unanimous consent of
shareholders.
The opportunistic amendment hypothesis cannot explain why
mandatory rules are still necessary under these circumstances. One
explanation is that mandatory rules may incur lower decisionmaking costs compared to entrenched provisions because there is
still some chance that mandatory rules would be amended later by
statute or modified by a court through an altered interpretation of
such rules. The decision-making costs of mandatory rules may still
be higher than most rules of supermajority vote, depending on how
frequently the state amends its corporate statutes.
The constitutional economic theory offered in this Article can
better explain the mandatory nature of charter amendment rules by
suggesting that shareholders should choose different charter
amendment rules for different issues to balance external costs and
decision-making costs. For provisions in a corporate charter
concerning the fundamental interests of shareholders, state
legislatures may treat these provisions as mandatory because

183
Klaus J. Hopt, Directors’ Duties and Shareholders’ Rights in the European
Union: Mandatory and/or Default Rules? 9, 13-32 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. [ECGI]
1, Law Working Paper No. 312/2016, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2749237
[https://perma.cc/5HCL-F3WF].
184
Under the 2006 Companies Act of the U.K., shareholders can agree to a set
of “entrenched provisions” which cannot be amended unless by unanimous
consent. Companies Act 2006, c. 46, supra note 1, § 22 (Eng.).
185
Id.
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reducing external costs is more important.186 Mandatory rules incur
lower external costs compared to a majority vote or a supermajority
vote by shareholders, since corporate insiders cannot
opportunistically amend the charter. They are thus similar to a
unanimous vote by shareholders from an external-cost standpoint.
The above analysis also explains why mandatory rules in
corporate law vary over time and across jurisdictions, which has not
been satisfactorily explained by existing theories. Eisenberg argues
that certain constitutive rules, including structural rules,
distributive rules, and fiduciary rules, should be mandatory. 187
Structural rules “govern the allocation of decisionmaking power
among various corporate organs and agents and the conditions for
the exercise of decisionmaking power,” while distributive rules refer
to rules that “govern the distribution of assets (including earnings)
to shareholders.”188 These rules are important to prevent managers
from entrenching themselves at the expense of shareholders. 189
Similarly, Gordon distinguishes four types of mandatory rules:
procedural, power allocating, economic transformative, and
fiduciary standards setting. 190 However, these mandatory rules
have all been qualified to some extent.191 One important reason for
that qualification is that strict mandatory rules prevent corporations
from adopting innovative provisions necessary to cope with
emerging circumstances. Relaxing some of the constitutive rights
and structural rules may reduce decision-making costs.
Additionally, many alternative mechanisms, including shareholder
voting and market reputation, may help curb the opportunistic
amendment problem. The development of these institutional
186
It should be pointed out that current discussions in the academic literature
often use the term mandatory rules to refer to ex ante rules prescribed by legislatures
but not ex post decisions made by courts. Gordon, supra note 9, at 1553 n.16. Both
of them are referred to as mandatory rules in corporate law in this Article. They
are both interventions by a third party (state) in corporate charter amendments.
187
See Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 1462.
188
Id.
189
Eisenberg refers to this type of divergence of interests between managers
and shareholders as “positional conflicts.” Id. at 1480.
190
See Gordon, supra note 9, at 1591.
191
As Roberta Romano points out, many other amendments to corporate
charters that are not mandatory may also affect shareholders’ interests. Romano,
supra note 18, at 1606. Although Eisenberg has considered the rationale behind the
choice between these approaches, he has not systematically explored the factors
behind the costs of various approaches to charter amendment. See, e.g. Eisenberg,
supra note 18, at 1471.
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constraints may allow legislators to replace mandatory rules with
more flexible rules without the risk of increasing external costs.
Where courts are capable of detecting wrongdoing and curbing
opportunistic amendment ex post, ex ante mandatory rules can be
lifted to some extent. For example, courts in many states in the
United States once prohibited corporations from amending their
corporate charters and issuing a senior class of securities because
doing so violated the “vested property interests” of shareholders.192
The issuance of a new class of securities apparently affects the
interests of the existing shareholders and changes the “distributive
rules” of a corporation. Courts thus repeatedly enjoined against
such changes based on the “vested rights” theory.193 However, the
courts’ stance had gradually shifted in the early 20th century and
eventually permitted the issuance of new securities.194
Another example is the rule of fiduciary duty under corporate
law. While it is regarded as a constitutive rule, Delaware allows
corporations to exempt directors from liability for breach of their
duty of care.195 The theoretical framework of external and decisionmaking costs together explains why not all constitutive rules are
mandatory in all jurisdictions and why ex ante mandatory rules may
change over time.196
Lele and Siems compiled a “shareholder protection index,” and
attempted to compare the strength of shareholder protection across
countries by aggregating the scores for each country.197 They found
that the law of the United States does not offer very strong
protection for shareholders compared to many European
countries.198 This Article postulates that the index compiled by Lele
and Siems overlooks the possibility that in countries where judicial
review and alternative mechanisms offer strong constraints on
corporate conduct and protection for outside shareholders, relaxing
ex ante mandatory rules may reduce decision-making costs. Thus,
having relatively light regulations on corporate internal governance
mechanisms in the corporate law does not suggest that the corporate
See Coffee, Jr., supra note 34, at 1640.
See Coffee, Jr., supra note 34, at 1641.
194
Id.
195
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)7; Romano, supra note 18, at 1601.
196
For a discussion of the historical development of the vested property
interest doctrine, see Branson, supra note 40; Latty, supra note 103, at 1-51.
197 See Lele & Siems, supra note 34, at 43.
198 Id.
192
193
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law is weak in protecting shareholders in a specific state. In fact,
most of these variables Lele and Siems choose are about the rules
governing internal governance mechanisms, including for example,
rules governing shareholder meeting, composition of the board,
agenda setting power, shareholders’ rights to information, and
mandatory rules in corporate law.199 They have not considered the
important role played by courts and the stock exchanges in
regulating corporate decisions.
It should be noted that the above discussion of mandatory rules
only considers the shareholder-manager relationship, rather than
the broader panoply of relationships between shareholders and
other stakeholders such as creditors, consumers and laborers.
Corporate law contains provisions that protect the interests of
creditors, which are made mandatory to prevent shareholders from
amending them to obtain more benefits at the expense of creditors.
An example would be the unique structure of the board of directors
in Germany, which offers strong protection to laborers. 200 The
analysis for relationships of that nature would be different since
such relationships are about the conflicts of interests between
shareholders and other stakeholders that shareholder voting cannot
resolve.
2.3. The Appraisal Remedy
Apart from mandatory rules, the appraisal remedy also governs
the amendment of some charter provisions. In the United States,
every state grants the appraisal remedy to minority shareholders in
the case of a merger that also triggers an amendment to a corporate
charter. Some states grant appraisal rights when a corporation
amends its charter. 201 Many scholars have launched criticisms
against appraisal rights, questioning whether those rights can
protect minority shareholders. One of the most important criticisms
Id.
See Luca Enriques et al., The Basic Governance Structure: Minority
Shareholders and Non-Shareholder Constituencies, in REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 101
(Oxford University Press 2nd ed. 2009).
201
See Mahoney & Weinstein, supra note 24 at 239. In Delaware, corporations
may provide in their charter that an amendment to the corporate charter would
trigger the appraisal rights. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(c).
199
200
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of the appraisal remedy is that courts often impose strict procedural
constraints on dissenting shareholders who seek the appraisal
remedy.202 In addition, appraisal rights can be “a frightful nuisance,
drain, and burden” on listed corporations.203 Corporations cannot
know in advance how many shareholders would dissent and, hence,
cannot easily calculate the amount of cash they need to prepare in
advance. These problems may prevent efficient merger transactions
from occurring.204 In subsequent studies, scholars have generally
agreed with Manning’s critique on the inability of appraisal rights
to protect minority shareholders.205

202
See Manning, supra note 24, at 227, 230-33. Apart from the procedural
costs, scholars have provided many other criticisms. Some scholars argue that
shareholders would not vote against a value-decreasing amendment because of the
rational ignorance problem. Bebchuk, supra note 25 at 1854 (“[I]t is far from clear
that a substantial fraction of the shareholders will file for appraisal. Because of the
rational ignorance problem, the fraction of shareholders voting against a valuedecreasing amendment might often be quite small or even nonexistent.”). Another
problem is that the costs of appraisal are borne by other shareholders, whose
interests do not concern managers. Bebchuk, supra note 25, at 1854 (“The cost of
their use of their rights, however, will not be borne by the managers but rather by
the other shareholders.”); Black, supra note 18, at 583. Perhaps the earliest and the
most famous critique was offered by Bayless Manning in 1962. Manning questions
the underlying rationales of the triggering conditions for appraisal right. It has
been unclear, Manning argues, that shareholders should be able to “jump clear of
the corporate enterprise if they do not like its course.” Apparently, many events
may threaten the interests of shareholders in a corporation, including for example,
the corporation filing involuntary dissolution, change in business scope, a massive
dividend distribution, “Mass resignation by the management,” “introduction of a
new product by a competitor,” and even “a Presidential heart attack.” However,
many states only allow shareholders the appraisal rights in a corporate merger,
while some grants the appraisal remedy when a corporation amends its charter.
Manning, supra note 24, at 237-239, 241-244. For earlier discussion, see Brown, supra
note 25, at 845; Note, supra note 25, at 340-343.
203
See Manning, supra note 24, at 234.
204
Id. at 235.
205
See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL
ANALYSIS 70 (1976) (arguing that the exercise of appraisal rights is “highly technical,
drawn-out, and expensive”); Richard M. Buxbaum, The Dissenter’s Appraisal
Remedy, 23 UCLA L. REV. 1229, 1253-54 (1976) (analyzing the vices of appraisal
procedures in California’s new corporation law); Mahoney & Weinstein, supra note
24, at 243-45 (providing empirical analysis on how appraisals may reduce
shareholder gains on average in transactions involving “self-interested managers”);
George S. Geis, Internal Poison Pills, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1169 (2009) (discussing the
idea of an “internal poison pill” as an alternative mechanism to govern the tension
between minority and majority shareholders); Thompson, supra note 24, at 11-12
(discussing the new transactional settings for appraisal processes, and how they
require amendments to the appraisal provisions).
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Constitutional economic theory offers justification for the
procedural costs imposed on shareholders and on corporations. The
appraisal remedy should be made costly both for the corporation and
for shareholders. 206 On the one hand, it is intended to curb
opportunistic actions by the majority shareholders or insiders and,
thus, would inevitably impose costs on the corporations.207 On the
other hand, the design of appraisal rights should also generate
significant costs for minority shareholders. If minority shareholders
are offered an appraisal remedy that is not costly at all, they would
be incentivized to exercise that right opportunistically, which would
increase the decision-making costs of a merger or a corporate charter
amendment.208
For example, one of the crucial questions in an appraisal regime
is how the fair value of the stock should be calculated. Should a
court simply award the shareholder the market price of their stock?
Or should shareholders be entitled to certain “inframarginal value”
or, in a merger situation, a proportion of the premium generated by
206
See Vorenberg, supra note 27, at 1216-17 (“[B]alancing the relative dangers
of oppression by the majority and harassment by the minority and what weight is
accorded the importance of giving considerable leeway for change and growth.”);
Note, supra note 25, at 340:

Financial burdens incident to appraisal proceedings, however, can thwart
the compensatory adjustment intended by the statutes. Unless a
shareholder can shift these burdens, appraisal may be a barren right. On
the other hand, if his threat of costly proceedings can extort exorbitant
settlement, appraisal rights so abused may block or heavily tax desirable
corporate change.
207
See Daniel R. Fischel, The Appraisal Remedy in Corporate Law, 8 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 875, 901-02 (1983).
208
See Norman D. Lattin, Remedies of Dissenting Stockholders Under Appraisal
Statutes, 45 HARV. L. REV. 233, 233-234 (1931):

The problem of the dissenting stockholder and his remedies under
modern appraisal statutes has been one of conflict between strong and
divergent interests. On the one hand is the need of flexibility, ease, and
dispatch when change in structure or financial reorganization through one
of several means is necessary . . .Contrariwise stands the interest of the
minority who have honest convictions in the matter.
See Henry W. Ballantine & Graham Lee Jr. Sterling, Upsetting Mergers and
Consolidations: Alternative Remedies of Dissenting Shareholders in California, 27 CALIF.
L. REV. 644, 651 (1939) (discussing “the desirability of making appraisal of the shares
exclusive of irresponsible attacks to set aside a consolidation or merger is at least a
fairly debatable measure [ . . .]” and how it is necessary to device “forms of
remedies which will not unduly hamper and threaten the transaction of legitimate
business.”).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss2/4

2019]

Corporate Charter Amendment Rules

483

the offer in the merger? 209 Simply awarding shareholders the
market price would be meaningless; shareholders could simply sell
their shares without resorting to litigation. However, giving
shareholders a premium would encourage them to
opportunistically hold up the decision to amend the corporate
charter in order to obtain that premium.
Viewed from the perspective of external and decision-making
costs, the strict procedural constraints on the exercise of appraisal
rights and the uncertainty in the calculation of the fair value of
stocks can achieve a balance between external and decision-making
costs.210 In fact, the appraisal remedy is almost always entangled
with the question of misconduct by controlling shareholders and
determined by courts on a case-by-case basis. When courts detect
wrongful conduct committed by a majority shareholder, they tend
to provide a favorable appraisal remedy to minority shareholders.211

209
See Wertheimer, supra note 26, at 680, fn. 339 (arguing that “wrongdoing or
breach of fiduciary duty significantly impacts the outcome of appraisal
proceedings.”); Cavalier Oil Corp., 564 A.2d at 1137; In re Radiology Assocs., 611 A.2d
at 485 (Plaintiff stockholder brought a claim against defendants challenging the
fairness of his shares’ price set forth by the corporation, when the shares were
eliminated because of a merger. The court was faced with the issue of how to
determine the fair price of the shares when granting the appraisal remedy; the
Court held that in the particular case the preferred valuation method was the
discounted cash flow analysis, taking into account that the other available methods
did not adequately reflect the shares’ market value). Neal, 1990 WL 109243, at *1.
(Plaintiffs, minority stockholders of Alabama By-Products Corporation, made a
claim seeking appraisal of their shares as the result of a merger based on which
Alabama By-Products Corporation was absorbed into the Drummond Company,
Inc. The minority shareholders of Alabama By-Products Corporation were cashed
out. As dissenting minority shareholders, petitioners considered the price of their
shares inadequate, and filed a claim for unfair dealing, along with an appraisal
action.). See also Koh, supra note 26, at 433-34. (describing three possible subconcepts of fair value: pro-rata going concern value, but-for value, and fair synergy
distribution value).
210
Similar arguments have been made before but have not drawn sufficient
attention. See Irving J. Levy, Rights of Dissenting Shareholders to Appraisal and
Payment, 15 CORNELL L. Q. 420, 442-443 (1929-1930) (“[A]rbitrarily to tax such costs
against the corporation might encourage objecting stockholders to use the remedy
for blackmailing the corporation with unreasonable demands. To levy them against
the stockholders would have a similar opposite effect.”).
211
See Kanda & Levmore, supra note 26, at 433. Wertheimer, supra note 26, at
680, fn. 339 (arguing that “wrongdoing or breach of fiduciary duty significantly
impacts the outcome of appraisal proceedings.”); Cavalier Oil Corp., 564 A.2d at
1137; In re Radiology Assocs., 611 A.2d at 485; Neal, 1990 WL 109243, at *1. See
generally Koh, supra note 26.
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The above analysis casts doubt on the proposal that the current
procedural requirements for appraisal rights should be modified to
make the remedy less onerous for minority shareholders. 212
Relaxing the procedural requirements and burdens on minority
shareholders may render it too easy for shareholders to claim
appraisal and would, thus, significantly raise the decision-making
costs for corporations.213
The constitutional economic theory also explains why the
appraisal remedy has been, so far, mainly a unique feature of the
law in the United States, while in the U.K., France and Germany,
dissenting shareholders are offered a way out only in exceptional
circumstances. 214 One of the dominant factors in considering
whether to grant appraisal rights to dissenting shareholders is the
capacity of the court.215 The appraisal remedy will be more effective
if courts can accurately detect wrongdoings by controlling
shareholders and determine the fair value of stocks accurately
without significant systemic errors.216 Whether it is a desirable rule
in a specific state also depends on how effective a supermajority vote
would be. The presence of the appraisal remedy in the United States
again suggests that the legal system in the United States is more
sophisticated than others. For example, France offers minority
shareholders a way out if the controlling shareholders hold more

212
See, e.g., Wertheimer, supra note 26, at 708 (“A third area where appraisal
statutes could be improved is with respect to the procedures incident to the remedy.
In many statutes, the procedural requirements imposed on a dissenting shareholder
remain excessively onerous.”).
213
The development of the appraisal rights in Canada provides a good
illustration of this point. When Canada first introduced the regime of the appraisal
remedy, courts were generally sympathetic with dissenting shareholders and set
the fair price above the market price. This attitude changed later, however, since
courts realize it was important to balance the interests of dissenting shareholders
and those of the corporation. Brian R. Cheffins & J. Dine, Shareholder Remedies:
Lessons from Canada, 13 COMPANY LAWYER 89, 92 (1992).
214
In Belgium and France, the statutes do not provide appraisal rights for
dissenting shareholders in listed corporations. See Sofie Cools, The Real Difference
in Corporate Law between the United States and Continental Europe: Distribution of
Powers, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 697, 727 (2005); Decree No. 88-603 of May 7, 1988, J.O.,
May 8, 1988, p. 6606, arts. 5-5-1 to 5-5-6 (Fr.).
215
Many scholars question the ability of courts to measure the value of the
charter amendment accurately. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 25, at 1855.
216
See Wertheimer, supra note 26, at 678 (“In cases where the dissenting
shareholders achieve a favorable result, there almost invariably is evidence that the
acquiring party acted inequitably or engaged in overreaching.”).
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than 95% of the shares in the corporation.217 However, under French
law, a market regulator, the Financial Markets Authority, not the
courts, is in charge of the enforcement of the appraisal remedy.218
The additional challenge posed by this difference is that the
appraisal remedy may be difficult to enforce for a jurisdiction where
courts are not accustomed to dealing with the evaluations of a
corporation.
3.

IMPLICATIONS

The above framework of external and decision-making costs has
important theoretical implications on two lines of academic
discussions: the debate of whether to empower shareholders in the
United States and the role of law and contract in corporate
governance. This Section will address these implications.
3.1. Choosing Mandatory Rules in Corporate Law
The above analysis provides a theoretical framework for
analyzing the social costs and benefits of making certain rules in
corporate law mandatory, which may benefit developing countries
where policymakers have yet to determine whether to employ
mandatory rules in corporate law to regulate charter amendment.
The analysis suggests that in evaluating the costs of mandatory
rules, we must also consider mandatory rules enacted by alternative
institutions such as stock exchanges. Stock exchanges play a
significant role in enacting mandatory rules that apply to
corporations listed at a certain exchange. For example, in the United
States, the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) has long prohibited
deviation from the “one-share-one-vote” principle, although some
stock exchanges proposed to change this rule in recent years.219 In
217 See CHRISTOPHER JOSEPH MESNOOH, LAW AND BUSINESS IN
TO FRENCH COMMERCIAL AND CORPORATE LAW 139 (1994).

FRANCE: A GUIDE

See Rock et al., supra note 12, at 191.
See Annie Massa, Will Wall Street Buy Into the Slow Stocks Movement?,
NEWS,
(Apr.
13,
2018),
BLOOMBERG
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-13/will-wall-street-buy218
219

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

486

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 41:2

many other states, this principle is stipulated in corporate law.
Corporate law in Germany generally follows the “one-share-onevote” principle and prohibits any deviation from this principle,
including for example, time-phased voting arrangements and
voting caps. 220 This Article suggests that there is an important
difference between stipulating the “one-share-one-vote” principle in
the listing rules of stock exchanges and stipulating that principle in
national statutes or regulations. Using listing rules of stock
exchanges to regulate the opportunistic amendment problem can
significantly reduce decision-making costs since such regulations
can be amended relatively quickly to adapt to changing
circumstances. If the “one-share-one-vote” principle is made
mandatory in corporate law, the decision-making costs would be
much higher since amending the corporate statutes incurs much
higher legislative costs.
The social costs of mandatory rules in a state also depend on its
legal system. In a state with a federal legal system, the decisionmaking costs of making “one-share-one-vote” mandatory in some
states are relatively lower since a corporation can pick the state
where it wants to incorporate in. States generally amend their
corporate statutes frequently. In a unitary system, by contrast,
preventing corporations from adopting schemes that grant more
voting rights to some shareholders may significantly affect the
ability of the corporations to adapt to new circumstances and thus,
force the corporation to incur higher decision-making costs.
3.2. The Debate over Increasing Shareholder Power in the United
States
The bilateral veto arrangement in the United States has long
been a focus of debate. Some scholars argue that corporate law
should increase shareholders’ power and allow them to initiate
charter amendment.221 For example, Lucian Bebchuk has provided
into-the-slow-stocks-movement [https://perma.cc/6SKY-5VBQ]；John McCrank,
Silicon Valley firm floats listings plan via ‘Flash Boys’ exchange, REUTERS (Mar. 19, 2018),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-listing-iexgroup-ltse/silicon-valleyfirm-floats-listings-plan-via-flash-boys-exchange-idUSKBN1GV2MG
[https://perma.cc/BV9M-6EAK].
220
See Enriques et al., supra note 200, at 59.
221
See generally Bebchuk, supra note 29.
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a comprehensive discussion of the benefits of increasing the power
of shareholders in the United States. He argues that corporate
charters need to adapt to new circumstances, while the veto power
of the board will prevent efficient adaptation and create a “promanagement distortion.”222 Others point out that granting power to
the board of directors benefits shareholders.223
This Article sheds new light on the debate over whether
shareholders should be allowed to initiate amendment of corporate
charters.
Current discussions have focused largely on the
shareholder-manager conflicts rather than the conflicts of interests
among shareholders. 224 Increasing shareholder power to initiate
proposals to amend corporate charters may lead to a rise in external
costs since charter amendment would become easier.
The
amendment of a corporate charter initiated by some shareholders
may not benefit shareholders as a whole, since different
shareholders may have idiosyncratic interests.225 For example, in a
takeover context, a corporation may have certain defensive tactics
such as a staggered board that can enhance the bargaining power of
the original shareholders of the corporation and allow them to
obtain more benefits from the takeover transaction.226 If corporate
law in the United States increases shareholders’ power and allows
them to initiate changes to the corporate charter, some shareholders
may acquire a significant proportion of shares and seek to amend
the takeover defenses in the corporate charter, which may benefit
the hostile acquirer at the expense of other shareholders. 227 The
requirement that any amendment to the corporate charter needs to
be initiated by the board of directors establishes an additional
barrier for the amendment of corporate charters and thus reduces
the external costs.
To be sure, the exact level of external costs that may arise if
shareholders can initiate charter amendment is difficult to measure.
It is nonetheless important to note that any proposal to change the
bilateral veto regime needs to consider the balance between external
Id.
See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 30.
224 See Goshen, supra note 30, at 791.
225
See Bainbridge, supra note 30, at 1745 n.54.
226
See Coffee, Jr., supra note 32, at 1175; Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role
of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, supra note 32, at 1169.
227
Recent studies show that a staggered board promotes the value of a
corporation. See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 32, at 80.
222
223
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and decision-making costs. If corporate laws in the United States
are to allow shareholders to initiate charter amendment and also
seek to maintain the same level of external costs, these laws must
consider raising the threshold for charter amendment from a simple
majority vote of shares to a supermajority votes. Doing so, however,
may increase decision-making costs.
3.3. The Essential Role of Corporate Law
Another relevant question in the corporate law literature is
whether corporate governance is essentially about law or contract.228
The theory offered in this Article also offers a new account of why
law is important in corporate governance. While shareholders of a
corporation can create “entrenched provisions” that are similar in
function to mandatory rules—thereby resolving the opportunistic
amendment problem—these entrenched provisions may incur high
decision-making costs. It is because of these high decision-making
costs that mandatory rules become necessary. Mandatory rules
essentially allow corporations to “amend” the rules without going
through the shareholder voting process and to free ride on the
efforts of legislatures and courts.229
It should be noted, however, that decision-making costs alone
also cannot explain why some provisions are mandatory in
corporate law. If decision-making costs were the only concern,
states should provide default rules and expect corporations to
follow them because such rules would allow corporations to then
free-ride on the efforts of legislatures and courts when corporations
seek to amend these provisions.230 The problem is that corporate
insiders or controlling shareholders may then amend the provisions
in the charter in the midstream in ways that harm shareholders’
interests since those provisions are merely default rules that can be
amended with relative ease. Mandatory rules can only be explained

228
Whose members are mainly nominated and appointed by the controlling
shareholder. Hansmann, supra note 3, at 9.
229
Some scholars have noticed that a major function of default rules in
corporate law is to reduce decision-making costs. This Article suggests that
mandatory rules in corporate law can also be explained with the same theory.
Listokin, supra note 18, at 279-308. See also Hansmann, supra note 3, at 9.
230
See Listokin, supra note 18, at 279-308.
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by considering both decision-making costs and external costs (i.e.
the needs for adaptation and commitment).
By taking the perspective of comparative law, this Article also
suggests that corporate law plays a larger role in corporate
governance in some jurisdictions than others, depending on the
legal institutions and ownership structures of the corporations in
these different jurisdictions. In jurisdictions where legislatures and
courts are more capable of making appropriate rules and detecting
opportunist actions, law may play a larger role in corporate
governance. Where shareholders can write and amend their
corporate contracts with lower costs, however, law may be less
important in corporate governance. In the United States, judicial
review plays a far greater role in governing midstream changes,
while in many other developed countries, supermajority vote by
shareholders are more important constraints on charter amendment.
4.

CONCLUSION

The corporate charter is the constitution of a corporation. How
should it be amended? This Article identifies a fundamental
tradeoff between the needs for commitment and adaptation, or, in
economic terms, external and decision-making costs. Different
provisions in a corporate charter should be subject to different
amendment rules. This theory can explain why the charter
amendment rules vary significantly between the state of Delaware,
the U.K., France, and Germany. This Article has identified several
important factors that may affect external and decision-making
costs, including judicial capacity, the ownership structure of
corporations, and the frequency of and procedural constraints
imposed on the amendment of the corporate statutes. Different
states may choose different charter amendment rules given their
respective institutional constraints.
Within a given state, different charter amendment rules should
be chosen to govern the amendment of different rules. Shareholders
should delegate the power to the board to amend trivial provisions.
For more important issues, shareholders should use a majority vote
or a supermajority vote.
For provisions that involve the
fundamental interests of shareholders, the state legislatures and
courts should decide that such provisions are mandatory and cannot
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be amended. This theory can better explain mandatory rules in
corporate law than other theories.
The theory offered in this Article also explains the design of the
appraisal remedy. It suggests that the appraisal remedy needs to
strike a balance between protecting the interests of dissenting
shareholders from controlling shareholders or corporate insiders
and preventing dissenting shareholders from holding out a decision
that benefits shareholders as a whole. As a result, the use of
appraisal remedy must be strictly constrained. This theory casts
doubts on proposals to alleviate the procedural burden on
dissenting shareholders in exercising their appraisal rights.
The theoretical framework proposed in this Article generates
three important implications. This framework first suggests that in
deciding whether to adopt mandatory rules in corporate law,
policymakers should pay attention to alternative mechanisms that
might achieve similar goals without incurring high decision-making
costs, especially in emerging economies where the legislative and
court systems differ significantly from those in developed
economies.
Second, this Article sheds new light on the debate over whether
to increase shareholders’ power and grant them the power to initiate
charter amendment in the United States. The bilateral veto
arrangement can be viewed as setting up an additional barrier for
charter amendment to reduce external costs. Allowing shareholders
to initiate charter amendment reduces the decision-making costs but
may raise external costs. While a precise estimation of these costs is
usually difficult, any proposal to change the charter amendment
rules in the United States needs to consider both decision-making
costs and external costs together.
Finally, the theoretical framework offered in this Article deepens
the understanding of the role of law and contract in corporate
governance. While current studies emphasize the function of law in
curbing the opportunistic amendment problem, this Article suggests
another function of law—reducing decision-making costs.
Moreover, the role of the law may be more important in some
jurisdictions than others, depending on the relative costs of
shareholder voting and mandatory rules.
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